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BAD POLICY AS A RECIPE FOR BAD
FEDERALISM IN THE REGULATION
OF CANADIAN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF LOAN

AND TRUST COMPANIESO
By RONALD J. DANms*
This article addresses the impact of substantive policy on federal arrangements in
the regulation of Canadian loan and trust companies. It is argued that reliance
on market-suppressing policies (flat-rate based deposit insurance and selective
bail-outs of depositors in the event of institutional failure) has undermined the
value of competitive federalism in this area, and has spawned highly contentious
policy initiatives such as Ontario's Equals Approach. To redress the federalism
problems in the regulation of loan and trusts, a useful starting point would be the
enhancement of market forces in substantive policy. Here, it is argued that the
commitment to secrecy regulation by financial institution regulators has impeded
this enterprise.
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I. INTRODUCrION
In a country where interminable federal-provincial power
squabbling is virtually a national pastime, the observation that alternative
distribution of power arrangements can shape, sometimes even
determine, substantive policy outcomes is commonplace. What is
generally less appreciated, however, is that this causal relationship can
work in reverse--i.e., certain substantive policy commitments can affect
the workability of various distribution of power arrangements. One of
the starkest examples of this reciprocal relationship can be found in the
regulation of Canadian loan and trust corporations.' Because loan and
1 like other financial intermediaries, the traditional role of loan and trust corporations has been
to reconcile the conflicting needs of savers for relatively passive, low-risk, liquid investments with the
needs of borrowers for long term, illiquid debt that requires close monitoring. Historically, loan and trust
corporations have differed from other financial intermediaries in terms of the concentration of their
lending activities in residential mortgages and small consumer loans and in their ability to engage in feebased fiduciary activities (The historical evolution of trust companies is described in E.P. Neufeld, The
FinandalSystem ofCanada (roronto: Macmillan, 1972) at 9). However, as a number of commentators
have noted, for all intents and purposes, the substantive differences between the activities of loan and
trust corporations and those of other financial intermediaries, particularly the chartered banks, have
been dulled considerably by regulatory and market innovations, which have occurred over the past
several decades. (P.N. McDonald, "The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism"
(1972) 10 Alta. LRev. 155 at 166: "Ifbanking is synonymous with financial intermediation, then the trust
companies ... are banks notwithstanding the statutory declaration of trust in respect of their liabilities to
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trust corporations are subject to both federal and provincial jurisdiction,
the industry is faced with regulations that overlap-often even

contradict-one another, generating a patchwork-quilt regulatory
regime that is distinguished mainly by its lack of underlying coherence. 2
But just as federalism arrangements in loan and trust regulation have
impacted on policy, so too have policy commitments impacted negatively
on federalism. Of these policies, perhaps the most destructive has been
the long-standing and widely shared commitment of financial regulators
to policies that, whether intentionally or not, suppress the disciplinary

force of external markets. An even greater concern is that these
policies not only distort optimal incentives for industry members, but
they also affect provincial governments. These actions have, in turn,
provoked a regulatory counter-reaction, which further strains the
federal dynamic.
Despite the intricate and interdependent relationship that exists
between federalism and policy, it is striking that the corrosive role of

market-suppressing policies has been all but ignored in the
contemporary debate over the efficacy of federal arrangements in the

loan and trust area. Instead of addressing the question of what the
ideal content of financial institution regulation should be, participants in
the debate have remained fixated on the the second order question of
who gets to regulate financial institutions. It is, however, a central
theme of this article that unless regulators turn their attention to
questions of substance-namely, the appropriateness of continued
devotion

to market-suppressing policies-many of the most

dysfunctional features of federalism will remain in force.
customers"). The rationale for financial intermediation is explored in: H. Leland & D. Pyle,
"Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation" (1977) 32 J. Fin. 371;
D.W. Diamond, "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring" (1984) 51 Rev. Econ. Stud. 393;
R.T.S. Ramakrishnan & A.V. Thakor, "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial
Intermediation" (1984) Rev. Econ. Stud. 415; M. Millon & A. Thakor, "Moral Hazard and Information
Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies" (1985) 40 J. Fin. 1403; and J.H. Boyd
& E.C. Prescott, "Financial Intermediary Coalitions" (1986) 38 J. Econ. Theory 211.
2 Both the federal and provincial governments claim jurisdiction under the ConstitutionAct 1867
(U.K), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, to charter loan and trust corporations. Federal jurisdiction emanates from
the federal incorporation power (s. 91(15)), while provincial jurisdiction derives from authority over
property and civil rights in the province (s. 92(13)) and over the incorporation of companies with
provincial objectives (s. 92(11)).
3 The impact of federalism on the regulation of financial institutions has been discussed in a
number of different articles. See, for instance W.D. Moull, EJ. Waitzer & J. Ziegel, "The Changing
Regulatory Environment for Canadian Financial Institutions: Constitutional Aspects and FederalProvincial Relations" in J. Ziegel, L Waverman &D.W. Conklin, eds., CanadianFinancialInstitutions:
Changing the Regulatory Environment (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985) at 101. See also
McDonald, supra note 1; and J.F. Chant & J.W. Dean, "An Approach to the Regulation of Banking
Institutions in a Federal State" (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 721.
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The corrosive effect that market-suppressing policies have had
on the federal dynamic in the loan and trust area can be best illustrated
by reference to the theory of competitive federalism. An identification
of the prerequisites for an effective decentralized federalism can
facilitate an understanding of the distortionary impact of certain
regulatory policies on federal arrangements. Once the corrosive effect
of these policies is understood, policy makers can then turn their
attention to substantive policy reform. To assist in this exercise, I
consider a range of different policy modifications designed to enhance
the vigour of market oversight. Ultimately, I conclude that, until
regulators substantially revise their commitment to secrecy based
regulation, the suitability of reliance on enhanced depositor vigilance is
questionable. A preferable way of augmenting market oversight would
be to modify the incentives facing shareholders and regulators.
II. THE COMPETITIVEMODEL OF FEDERALISM
The competitive model of federalism is based on the idea that a
political system comprised of multiple competing providers of regulatory
product is most conducive to the realization of certain vaunted political
and economic goals. This model is rooted in Schumpetarian notions of
entrepreneurial efficiency5 and Madisonian 6 visions of democracy.
Specifically, the model envisages numerous state or provincial
governments endowed with jurisdiction over the same subject area so
that citizens can migrate to whichever jurisdiction offers the most
attractive policy mix. 7 From a political perspective, the competitive model
4 For a brilliant synthesis of the arguments in favour of competitive federalism, see A. Breton,
"Supplementary Statements" in Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospectsfor Canada,vol. 3 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985) 483. See also
D.A. Kenyon & J. Kincaid, "Introduction" in D.A Kenyon & J. Kincaid, eds., Competition Among
States and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1991) 1; A. Breton, "The
Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional Competition" in Kenyon & Kincaid, ibid at 37; and J.
Kincaid, "The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal Democracy" in
Kenyon & Kincaid, ibid at 87. The actual operation of the competitive federalism model is explored at
great length in R. Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law
Market" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 130.
5 JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row,
1975) at 84-85.
6 James Madison, The Federalist(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).
7 Not unlike the allocation of resources in private economic markets, the production of laws in the
decentralized model is seen to be guided by the "invisible hand" of consumer demand. In this model of
law production, local governmental units are believed to compete against one another in the provision
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of federalism is prized for several properties, including: hostility towards
concentrated governmental power, congeniality to highly participatory
forms of government decision making, and dedication to citizen
sovereignty. From an economic perspective, the model is valued for its
ability to force governments to produce regulatory products that are
responsive to consumers' (more appropriately, citizens') preferences.
At the core of the model is the claim that politicians and
bureaucrats will be devoted to citizens' preferences because of the fear
that sub-optimal regulation will precipitate a flight of citizens to
jurisdictions offering more favourable legislative product.8 Migration, or
the threat thereof, is seen to be an effective way of ensuring
governmental fidelity to citizens' preferences because it directly impacts
on the welfare of bureaucrats and politicians. The welfare of public
officials is threatened by migration because it typically reduces the
amount of revenue, and hence, power that is at their disposal. 9 Of
course, to the extent that the welfare functions of bureaucrats and
politicians are driven by goals unrelated to personal aggrandizement, or
if internal government structures confer wide scope on bureaucrats
of legislative products. Those governmental units providing superior products will, like "winners" in
economic markets, enjoy benefits from increased consumer patronage. In this framework, the fact that
gains in market share may accrue to one province at the expense of another is both predictable and
uncontroversial. Moreover, diversity in government output indicates either specialization of provincial
activity or legal innovations introduced by competitive governments in an effort to gain market share. In
any event, in this model, shifting market share, diversity of outcome, and competitive behaviour are
indicators of optimal processes of law production.
8 The claim that competitive interaction among governments is capable of producing superior laws
owes much to Tiebout's model of local government. See C.M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Public
Expenditures" (1956) 64 J. PoL Econ. 416. Tiebout designs his model of local government in an effort to
show that the interaction of local governments and "consumer-voters" could overcome daunting
revealed preference problems in the provision of public goods. Specifically, Tiebout posits that, under
certain simplifying assumptions (Le.,perfect information, negligible mobility costs, trivial external
economies and diseconomies, and a large set of available destination jurisdictions), the migratory
decisions of "consumer-voters" can reveal individual preferences (at 420). The greater the number of
choices (Le, local governmental units) that a "consumer-voter" can select from, the more likely that
optimal matches between "consumer-voters" and local governments will result. If there is a hint of
unreality about Tiebout's model, it is his assumption that local governments do not "adopt" the
preferences of "consumer-voters;" rather, local governments are only "adopted" by "consumer-voters."
The model of federalism developed in this article corrects for this deficiency and anticipates that
provinces will consciously modify their policy "bundies" so as to enhance the appeal of residency in their
jurisdiction to mobile constituents.
9 This feature is, of course, especially salient in the realm of corporate and commercial regulation,
where, in the absence of such mechanisms, politicians perceive relatively minuscule gains (in terms of
conventional votes) from the provision of innovative legislation. Consequently, they allow priorities in
these areas to fall to the bottom of the legislature's agenda. To some extent, the problems of political
neglect of corporate and commercial legislative priorities can be redressed through the use of4 among
other devices, sunset laws.
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and politicians to escape responsibility for poor decisions, 0 then many of
the predictions generated by the model will be undermined."
For the competitive model to operate effectively, four general
conditions must be satisfied: (i) a high degree of mobility of people and
resources; (ii) a large number of destination jurisdictions; (iii)
jurisdictional latitude in selection of laws; and (iv) full internalization of
policy effects. For most corporate and commercial policies, the greatest
difficulties for the decentralized model derive from a failure to satisfy
the first and fourth conditions. The first condition is difficult to realize

10

For instance, responsibility may be avoided through widespread use of compensation systems
that are based on tenure of service rather than actual productivity.
11 One of the earliest scholars to consider the nature of incentives operating on public officials
was Anthony Downs. See A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy(Boston: Little Brown, 1967) at 84-85. Downs
argued that public officials are motivated by a range of goals, including increased power, money,
prestige, convenience, pride in proficient performance of work, personal loyalty, desire to serve the
public interest, and a commitment to a specific programme of action. See also W.A. Niskanen, Jr.,
Bureaucracyand Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971); J. Donahue, 7he
PrivatizatinDecision: PublicEnds, PrivateMeans (New York- Basic Books, 1989) at 87; and MJ.
Trebilcock, L Waverman & J.R.S. Prichard, "Markets for Regulation: Implications for Performance
Standards and Institutional Design" in Government Regulation: Issues and Alternatives (Toronto:
Ontario Economic Council, 1978) 11, for support for the multi-goal conception of the public official
welfare function. More recently, Steven Kelman has argued that government officials are motivated by
a commitment to civic virtue. See Public Policy Workshop, What's Wrong with the Revolving Door?by
S. Kelman (Toronto: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1991). Other scholars, however, emphasize
the overriding desire of public officials to increase the size of their budget, and the inextricable
dependence of other goals upon this principal goal. See, for instance, D.C. Mueller, Public Choice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For a discussion of the role of bureaucratic behaviour in
shaping federalist institutions, see A.C. Cairns, "The Government and Societies of Canadian
Federalism" (1977) 10 Can J.PoL Sci. 695.
The issue of whether public officials are able to respond effectively to financial incentives has been
canvassed by D. Cohen. See D.S. Cohen, "Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment of the
State" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 213 and "Suing the State" ibid. at 630. Cohen argues that "[w]hatever
incentives financial risk have in the private sector, they are unlikely to operate in the same fashion in
public institutions" (at 646). Cohen asserts that the weak response of governments to financial
incentives is due to the lack of external constraint imposed by competitive markets, which enables
governments to reflect any costs imposed on them back onto the taxpayer or onto different institutions
or individuals within government See also Donahue, ibid. at 47-48, who argues that financial incentives
do not work in the government context because of the lack of meaningful standards of evaluation.
However, for a contraxy view, see I-L
Kee, "Incentives and Rewards in the Public Sector" (1986) 29 Can.
Public Adm. 545. Kee argues that there is no apriorireason that financial incentives could not work in
the public sector, especially for senior managers, given ample data on macro-level performance. Kee
claims that rejection of financial incentives in the public sector is based on philosophical and political
objections.
12 See Tiebout, supra note 8, and F.H. Easterbrook, "Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism" (1983) 26 JJ & Econ. 23 at 34.
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because of product bundling. 13 Because residence is often a
prerequisite for the consumption of policy and laws, citizen-consumers
are precluded from selecting the policies that they believe are best from
each jurisdiction. Instead, they will end up having to choose among
competing baskets of policies, some of which are desirable, some of
which are not. The fourth condition-full internalization of the costs
and benefits of laws onto their suppliers and consumers-is
compromised by sundry policy spillovers. In the corporate law case, for
instance, the integrity of a given jurisdiction's corporate law can be
subverted by aggressive assertion of jurisdiction by securities regulators
located in other provinces. 14 These spillover effects will perversely
distort optimal production and allocation decisions, causing competing
jurisdictions to produce too much or too little innovative policy.
III. LOAN AND TRUST REGULATION AND FEDERALISM
Although there is no a priori reason why the competitive
federalism model could not yield optimal policy in the regulation of loan
and trust companies, close examination of the institutional framework
for loan and trust regulation reveals the presence of debilitating

externalities which violate the fourth pre-condition for the competitive
model and thereby impair the effectiveness of the model.1 s Because of
13

In antitrust parlance, this bundling is referred to as a "tied sale" or a "tying arrangement." The
presumption underlying the prohibition of such arrangements is that consumers are prevented from
making optimal consumption choices. It should be noted, however, that a vociferous group of antitrust
scholars suggest that the prohibition on tying arrangements-and the "leverage theory" which is
invoked to justify the prohibition--cannot be supported on logical, principled grounds. See RH. Bork,
TheAntitntst Paradox.APolicy at War With Itself(New York: Basic Books, 1978) at 365-81; R.A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) at 226-27; and W.S. Bowman, Jr.,
"Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem" (1957/58) 67 Yale LJ. 19. For an article supporting
leverage theory, see L. Kaplow, "Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage" (1985) 85 Col. L.
Rev. 515. A critical discussion of this issue in a Canadian context is in B. Dunlop, D. McQueen & M.
Trebilcock, CanadianCompetition Policy: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto: Canada Law
Book, 1987) at 253-57.
14

Danieis, supra note 4 at 182-84.

15 The role for inter-jurisdictional competition in shaping policy outcomes in the financial
institutions area has been given some recognition by Canadian scholars. See, for instance, Royal
Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Cafada, EconomicManagement
and the Division ofPowers (Background Papers vol. 67) by T. Courchene (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) at 198 (endorsing the value of decentralized competition in the securities area); and
Canada, 16th Report of the StandingSenate Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce: Toward a
More Competitive FinancialEnvironment (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, May 1986) (Chairman: L Murray)
[hereinafter Towards a More Competetive FinancialEnvironment] at 63: "multiple jurisdictions maybe
conducive to greater experimentation and innovation. The costs of an inappropriate expansion of
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the federal government's commitment to flat-rate based deposit
insurance and, frequently, to de facto full protection for uninsured
depositors upon institutional failure, shareholders and managers of
loan and trust companies, as well as provinces, are able to externalize
most of the costs of an institution's investment activities onto the
federal government, which leads to predictable increases in institutional
risk-taking. This increase, however, has forced both the federal and,
surprisingly, the Ontario governments to introduce a variety of
measures that, by attempting to compensate for some of the perverse
incentives introduced by earlier policies, further impair the operation of
the competitive model.'.
A. The DistortionaryImpact of Government Intervention on Market
Conduct
1. Introduction
In this section, the impact of several of the key components of
financial institution regulation on the behaviour of various market
actors, namely the shareholders and depositors of loan and trust
corporations, will be assessed. 17 As this discussion shows, a range of
government policies has enabled shareholders-particularly those
whose human capital is not concentrated in the companies in which
they have invested financial capital-to run companies in a riskier
fashion than would be observed if their behaviour were regulated by a
different, more rational, set of rules.' 8 This propensity impacts directly
powers may still be serious, but these costs would be localized and thus minimized in comparison to a
situation where such an experiment were conducted nation wide"; and Law and Economics Workshop
Series, Regulation of FinancialInstitutions:Some Notes on Regulatory Competition (Working Paper
No. WS 1989-90-(5)) by N. Roy (Toronto: Faculty of Law, 1989) (decentralized competition led by
Quebec responsible for modernization of financial institution regulation).
16
This compensatory reaction is discussed below in Part V, and undercuts the first and third
conditions (jurisdictional mobility and jurisdictional latitude in the selection of laws, respectively) that
are necessary for the model to operate effectively.
17
A lucid introduction to the structure of financial institution regulation can be found in R.C.
Clark, "The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries" (1976) 86 Yale Li. 1. For a Canadian perspective,
see R.A. Schearer, J.F. Chant & DE. Bond, The Economics of the CanadianFinancialSystem, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1984).
18
Managers whose human and financial capital is heavily invested in the companies in which they
are employed will be less likely to exploit some of the gains that may be obtained from risky investment
activity than those whose capital is well diversified. See H. Garten, "What Price Bank Failure?" (1990)
50 Ohio State Li. 1059 at 1182; and A. Saunders, E. Strock, & M. Travlos, "Ownership Structure,
Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking" (1990) 45 J. Fin. 643 (stockholder controlled banks exhibited
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on the operation of competitive federalism because it encourages
shareholders to migrate to jurisdictions having excessively lenient (or
sub-optimal) regulatory standards. Unless constrained, unfettered
migration forces other jurisdictions to match the laws offered in the
most lenient jurisdiction, thereby producing a race to the bottom.
2. Flat-rate based deposit insurance
As a succession of governmental and quasi-governmental task
forces, commissions, and special committees have noted over the past
decade, the provision of flat-rate based deposit insurance by the
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIc) is inimical to the
efficient operation of market forces in the financial institutions area.1 9 In
Canada, deposit insurance was introduced by the federal government
in 1967 in the wake of a series of highly publicized financial institution
failures in Ontario. 20 Fearing the outflow of investor funds from
significantly higher risk-taking behaviour than managerially controlled banks during the 1979-1982
period of relative deregulation). For a general discussion of the agency costs emanating from
managerial risk aversion, see M. Jensen & W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 ("managers of large, publicly held
corporations seem to behave in a risk averse way to the detriment of the equity holders" (at 353)). See
also B. Holmstrom, "Moral Hazard and Observability" (1979) 10 Bell J. Econ. 74; and Y. Anuhud & B.
Lev, "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers" (1981) 12 Bell J.Econ. 605
("mergers ...
viewed as a managerial perquisite intended to decrease the risk associated with managerial
human capital. Accordingly, the consequences of such mergers may be regarded as an agency cost" (at
606)); and A. Marcus, "Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm" (1982) 13 Bell J. Econ. 369
("constrained managers overspend on variance reducing activities, thereby imposing a welfare loss on
the other owners, and by this definition, exhibit excessive risk aversion" (at 375)).
19 See, for instance, Canada, Final Report of the Working Group on the Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, June 1985) (Chairman: W.R. Wyman)
[hereinafter the Wyman Report] at 25-37. The Wyman Report is discussed at length in a symposium
issue of the Can. Bus. IU. See: (1985/86) 11 Can. Bus. I.. 97-256; Ontario, Report of the Task Forceon
FinancialInstitutions (Toronto: Queen's Printer, December 1985) (Chairman: J.S. Dupre) at 45-50;
Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Finance; Trade and Economic Affairs: Canadian
FinancialInstitutions (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, November 1985) (Chairman: D. Blenkarn); Canada,
Tenth Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce: DepositInsurance
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, December 1985); Canada, Tovards a More Competitive
FinancialEnvironment, supra note 15 at 2; and Canada, Report of the Inquiy into the Collapseof the
CCB and NorthlandBank (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, August 1986) (Commissioner W.Z.
Estey) [hereinafter the Estey Report] at 343-344. Many of these reports are discussed in R. Granatstein,
"Deposit Insurance Reform in Canada" (1986/87) 16 Man. L.R. 45. See also K.P. McGuinness & L.
Abrams, "Deposit Protection: Lessons Learned From Recent Experiences-Part 1" (1986/87) 12 Can.
Bus. I4. 185; and "Deposit Protection: Lessons Learned From Recent Experiences-Part II" (1986/87)
12 Can. Bus. IJ.312.
20 The failures involved Atlantic Acceptance Corp. Ltd. and Prudential Finance Corp. Ltd. of
Toronto.
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Ontario based institutions to federally chartered banks, Ontario initially
proposed the adoption of a provincial deposit insurance scheme
modelled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the
United States. 21 However, the federal government, perhaps motivated
by a desire to skim rents (in the form of annual insurance fees collected
from guaranteed institutions) 22 or to shore up the sagging reputation
of federally chartered banks that had extended loans to the failed
2
provincial institutions, 23occupied the field by establishing coic?
The mechanics of the scheme are relatively straightforward. As
in the United States, deposits made by individuals to cDIc-member
institutions are insured to a ceiling prescribed by law, currently $6 0 ,0 0 0 Z
21

The FDic was introduced by Roosevelt in 1933 in an effort raise the level of confidence in the
soundness of the American banking system. The genesis of the FDiC is discussed in G. Emerson,
"Guaranty of Deposits Under the Banking Act of 1933" (1933/34) 48 QJ.of Econ. 229 (reprinted in G.
Kaufman, ed., Restructuring the American FinancialSystem (Boston: Kiuwer Academic Publishers,
190) a 2).
22 Carr and Mathewson argue that the federal government's foray into deposit insurance was
motivated by a desire to earn rents from the administration of the scheme. See Working Paper Series,
The Effect of Deposit Insuranceon FinancialInstitutions (Working Paper No. 8903) by J.Carr & F.
Mathewson (Toronto: Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis, University of
Toronto, 1989). Ironically, however, as recent experience shows, deposit insurance does not constitute a
captive source of income for sponsoring governments. Invariably the right to collect yearly annual
insurance fees is accompanied by the obligation to assist ailing institutions at the time of collapse, which
can generate considerable cost for the sponsoring government. In the end of fiscal year 1990, for
instance, cic's deficit (which is financed by borrowings from the federal government) stood at $643
million, down from $1,245 million in 1986 (Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Report 1990
at 21).
23
A. Emid, "Quiet Watchdog CDIC Seeks a Higher Profile" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (11
September 1989) C4: "Nationally, the new agency reassured Canadian financial institutions of the
stability of their own system: the Royal Bank of Canada, the Toronto Dominion Bank, British
Mortgage and Trust Co. and (then) Canada Permanent Trust Co. had lent heavily to Atlantic
Acceptance."
24
Consequently, Ontario decided not to institute a separate scheme.
25

CanadaDeposit Insurance CorporationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-3, s.12 [hereinafter the Ad]. The
coverage restriction constitutes an attempt by the architects of the scheme to marry two different,
somewhat competing, objectives: (i) extending protection against the risk of institutional failure to only
those investors who, because of their lack of expertise or market power, are unable to make informed
investment choices; and (ii) ensuring that those investors who have the requisite sophistication and size
are motivated to exercise their judgment and skill in their investment activities in order to bring some
market pressure to bear on managers and owners of financial institutions. In this respect, the $60,000 cap
is a somewhat arbitrary and coarse threshold that is designed to delineate between these two investor
classes. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below in the context of bank closure policies, the $60,000 cap
has not always bound the federal government, and depositors have often received protection for their
entire deposit in the event of a failure. In addition to the ex post protection conferred by closure
policies, depositors have also been able to stretch the boundaries of formal coverage beyond the $60,000
ceiling through careful investment. The most frequently used device is that of the beneficial trust: by
setting up multiple accounts at a single institution, each of which is held for a different named
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Consequently, in the event of the failure of an insured financial
institution, the capital and accrued interest of depositors is guaranteed
by the government. The insurance cannot, however, be "purchased"
independently by depositors, and is only available by depositing in an
institution that is a "member" of the CDIc. Deposit insurance coverage
is obtained by way of application by the federally or provincially
chartered institution to, and approval by, the cic.26 Once an institution
becomes a member of the cDic it is required to pay an annual flat-rate
levy that does not exceed the amount of one-sixth of 1 per cent of
their deposit base.2 7 And, although there is provision in the CDIC's
chartering legislation for the imposition of a premium surcharge upon
an institution engaging in certain defined practices, the relatively low
ceiling on the amount of the surcharge has all but eviscerated its
disciplinary force.28
The perverse incentive effects (moral hazard problems)
occasioned by flat-rate based deposit insurance have been known to
academics and policy makers for several decades. 29 Because, under a
system of flat-rate based insurance, the insurer is unable to charge a
variable premium-one that is commensurate with the actual risk that
the institution brings to the insured pool-3 -the shareholders and
managers of that institution will, assuming no other countervailing
pressures, operate the institution in a riskier fashion than if the
institution were uninsured.
beneficiary, a single investor can invest considerable sums of money in the same institution. Indeed, use

of the trust contrivance has received not merely the tacit approval of cmc, but its explicit endorsement
(see brochure prepared by cac: "CIC Information," Revised December, 1990. The brochure actually

demonstrates how two related depositors could secure formal insurance coverage for more than $540,000
at the same financial institution).
26

Section 17 of the Ac4 supra note 25.

27

These requirements are set out in s. 21(1) of the Act, ibid.

28 Section 24(2) of the Act, ibM. restricts the size of the surcharge in any premium year to an
amount not to exceed the difference between one-third of 1 per cent of the insured deposits and the

regular premium.
29
The leading and most persistent critics of flat-rate based deposit insurance are E. Kane and K.
Scott. See, for instance: E. Kane, "The Role of Government in the Thrift Industry's Net Worth Crisis"
in GJ. Benston, ed., FinancialServices: The ChangingInstitutionsand Government Policy (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1983) c. 3; EJ. Kane, The Gathering Crisisin FederalDeposit Insurance
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985); K. Scott & T. Mayer, "Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some
Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform" (1971) 23 Stan. L.R. 857; and K. Scott, "Deposit
Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices" (1989) 44 Bus. Law. 907. See also GJ. Benston e
al, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986) c. 1.
30

The expected loss of failure is the probability that an institution will fail multiplied by the costs

of that failure. These costs include the actual shortfall on liquidated assets and the administrative costs
of bankruptcy proceedings.
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The intuition underlying this claim can be gleaned from a
comparison of the incentives that operate upon shareholders (and
their agents-the managers) in two states of the world: one without
deposit insurance and one with flat-rate based deposit insurance. 3, In
the first case, it will be assumed that: (i) deposit insurance is unavailable
from either public or private sources; (ii) all financial institutions are
owned and managed by single individuals and that these individuals are
not risk averse; and (iii) there are no endemic collective action problems
that limit depositors' ability to negotiate appropriate debt covenants.
Under this scenario, the scope for opportunistic risk-taking is limited by
the fact that owner-managers will be confronted with the full
opportunity costs of any funds borrowed from outside creditors.
Recognizing that in a levered corporation the risks of corporate
investment decisions are borne asymmetrically by shareholders and
creditors, creditors will require owner-managers to provide full ex ante
compensation for any conduct that increases the prospect of firm
default.3 This risk compensation can be provided in two principal forms:
higher interest and restrictive covenants that reduce managerial
discretion. Since these devices narrow the actual returns to equity
investment, owner-managers will be judicious when constructing the
institution's asset portfolio. Simply, owner-managers will only increase
the overall risk of the institution's investment portfolio to the point
where the marginal returns to investment equal the marginal costs
occasioned thereby.
In contrast, if, under a second scenario, a financial institution is
able to secure insurance to protect depositors from the full cost of
failure, and the premium is only coarsely, if at all, sensitive to the
underlying risk of the institution, then it can be predicted that owner-

31 Another, more formal way of considering the impact of various deposit insurance arrangements
on the welfare of depositors, shareholders, and governments is through option pricing theory. See, for
instance, R. Merton, "An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees"
[June 1977] J. Banking and Fin. 1, and A. Marcus & L Shaked, "The Valuation of FDIC Deposit
Insurance Using Option Pricing Estimates" (1984) 16 . of Money, Credit and Banking 446. For a basic
introduction to the application of the option pricing model to deposit insurance, see M. Flood, "On the
Use of Option Pricing Models to Analyze Deposit Insurance" (1990) 72 Fed. Res. Board of St. Louis
Rev. 19.
32 Since risk is usually distributed around a mean, any increase in overall risk will increase, in a
symmetrical fashion, the likelihood of both excessive gains and losses being sustained on invested sums.
However, since depositors, as debtholders, receive a fixed rate of return on their investment (interest),
they can be seen to bear the consequences of increased risk asymmetrically. That is, if, expost, the
investment generates a high return for the financial institution, all of the gains will accrue to
shareholders, whereas if the investment is unsuccessful, the creditors may, depending upon the amount
of the equity buffer, lose the sums furnished to the borrower.

1993]

Loan and Trust Companies

managers of that institution will raise the overall risk of their investment
portfolio from the levels observed in the non-insurance case. Here,
owner-managers will realize that the costs of increased risk taking can be
externalized on the insurer with virtual impunity, while the benefits (L.,
increased prospect of high future payouts) can be wholly appropriated
by the owner-managers. This risk-subsidy occurs because of the
willingness of fully insured depositors to lend their money to institutions
engaging in high risk activities, and the inability of insurers to correct
this propensity by use of appropriately designed insurance premiums.3
In essence, when the external costs on the third party insurer are
taken into account, the level of aggregate portfolio risk will proceed to
the point where the marginal private benefits to shareholders from
investment risk are less than the marginal social costs. Thus, when
viewed from a global perspective, flat-rate based deposit insurance will
distort the allocation of capital in the economy toward risky assets!'
Of course, in a real world setting, the incentive-retarding effects
of flat-rate based insurance may be offset by a variety of factors, which
effectively limit the size of the subsidy transmitted by the insurer to the
insured. First, government regulation, in the form of premium
surcharges, portfolio restrictions, capital adequacy requirements and
reporting obligations, can reduce the scope for unlimited risk taking!"
Second, to the extent that managers are unable to diversify
away many of the risks tied to their human and financial investment in a
financial institution, they will be loathe to exploit fully the benefits of the
risk-subsidy because an increased risk of failure will also increase the
chance that the manager will suffer protracted and debilitating
unemployment. Managerial reluctance to assume additional risk will be
manifest both in settings where management and ownership are fused
33
In a regime characterized by complete insurance against default risk, depositors will not demand
additional compensation for added portfolio risk, and, as a consequence, owner-managers will be able
to increase the value of their residual claim by the amount of the present value of the subsidy on their
interest payments to creditors. The amount of the subsidy is equal to the present value of the market
interest rate on the institution's debt minus the present value of the interest rate actually paid on that
debt.
34 See Working Paper Series, The Impact of Deposit Insurance on S&L Shareholders'
RiskiRetun Trade-Offs (Working Paper No. WP-1989-24) by .Brewer Ill (Chicago: Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, 1989) for empirical confirmation of the risk subsidy claim.
35
However, the effectiveness of these constraints is critically dependent on the capacity of the
government to keep pace with industry innovations. A constant refrain among regulatees in the
financial area is the inability of governments to anticipate industry innovation. Consequently, many
laws are regulated out of date well before they are passed. See, for instance, H. Janisch, "Regulating
the Regulator.Administrative Structure of Securities Commissions and Ministerial Responsibility," in
Law Society of Upper CanadaSpecial Lectures (Toronto: DeBoo, 1989) 97.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 31 No. 3

and where they are not-although, predictably, the pressure upon
managers to assume more risk will be greater in the latter case than in
the former.
Third, if depositors face less than complete insurance for their
deposits, due to either explicit or implicit co-insurance requirements,
they can be expected to be more vigilant in their supervision of the
institutions in which they invest; this will correspondingly reduce the
scope for unfettered managerial risk-taking. In Canada, the fact that
formally insured depositors are often forced to bear at least some costs
upon a failure (for example, withdrawal and reinvestment costs) will

mean that they are not completely indifferent to risk.3
Finally, to the extent that industry participants are forced to
cover the costs of deficiencies generated by the insurance fund,
additional constraints on the scope for institutional risk-taking can be
expected to be imposed through industry self-monitoring and whistleblowing.3
Nevertheless, despite the potential that each of these factors
has to attenuate the strength of the perverse incentives created by flatrate based deposit insurance, there are still strong grounds for believing
that the effect of these incentives has not been entirely mitigated. In
large part, this result is attributable to defects that plague each of these
instruments. For instance, while government mandated portfolio rules
aspire to constrain the overall riskiness of an institution's portfolio,
these rules try to achieve this goal by prescribing permissible investment
classes (by type of asset) without regard to the considerable variance in
the risk of different assets within these classes or to the actual risk
contribution of certain assets to the entire pool. The rules are

36

Although, in the event of liquidation, insured depositors of failed institutions are forced to bear
the transactions costs of withdrawal and reinvestment (primarily administrative and search costs). These
costs are relatively trivial and in many cases, may be avoided altogether if the government arranges for a
purchase and assumption transaction. More sigiificant, however, are the foregone interest costs
experienced by depositors whose term deposits are prematurely cashed out by the liquidator when
interest rates have fallen from the levels prevailing at the time that the deposit was originally made.
37

Indeed, the fact that the highest proportion of uninsured Canadian deposits is found in large,
diversified banks, while the smallest proportion is found in smaller, regionally concentrated trust
companies lends some credence to this claim. (Data provided by Finance Department officials.)
38 Self-regulation by industry members is, however, constrained by endemic information
deficiencies. Review of the investor protection schemes devised by the Canadian insurance and
securities industries reveals greater scope for industry self-monitoring. SeeJ. Baillie, "Investor Protection
Plans" in Law Society of Upper CanadaSpecial Lectures (Toronto: DeBoo, 1989) 77 for a discussion of
the operation of thes schemes.
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therefore extremely porous, and subject to abuse by management."
Similarly, the fact that the deficits sustained by the insurance fund can
be financed through virtually open-ended, long-term borrowing from
the Consolidated Revenue Fund impairs industry incentives for vigilant
peer group monitoring.
3. Protection for uninsured depositors on a failure event through
bank closure policies
The second way in which government intervention thwarts
effective market vigilance is through the implementation of bank closure
policies. Depending on the type of mechanism used by the government
to close a failed financial institution, governments can provide full
protection to depositors for their investment, even if a substantial part
of that investment is uninsured, and would therefore be subject to
impairment under a conventional liquidation.40 The predilection for
adopting closure policies that provide de facto full protection to
depositors proves strongest the larger the size of the failed institution,
which, of course, raises vexing ethical issues. 1
39 These restrictions normally operate to restrict the amount of total portfolio risk through
limitations on types of assets, that is, commercial loans, direct real estate investments, and leasing.
However, even within these broad class restrictions, it is possible to generate asset portfolios with specific
risk characteristics by, for instance, increasing the geographic concentration of assets or by changing the
weight of certain assets in the portfolio, This point is discussed by Clark, supra note 17 at 60. The
relatively high percentage of assets that can be invested by loan and trust companies in first mortgages is
predicated on the assumption that these assets are low risk. However, as the recent experience of
savings and loan companies in the American South-West shows, by concentrating mortgage investment
in certain geographic regions with non-diversified economies, it is possible to construct quite risky
portfolios. See, for instance, K. Scott, "Never Again: The S and L Bailout Bill" and P. Horvitz, "The
Collapse of the Texas Thrift Industy:. Causes of the Problem and Implications for Reform," c. 6 and 7 in
Kaufman, supra note 21. See also P. McAllister & D. McManus, "Diversification and Risk in Banking:
Evidence From Ex Post Returns" Paper #201 in Finance and Economics Discussion Series of the
FederalReserve Board (June 1992) (significant reduction in institutional variance from geographic
diversification).
40 As Table 1, below, shows, of the 26 financial failures that have occurred from 1980 to 1991, only
4 (or 15 per cent) have actually imposed costs on uninsured depositors. Predictably, the institutions
subject to liquidation were considerably smaller than the ones that were not. The same trends are
evident in the United States. See Benston etaL, Pespectives (1986) supra note 29 at c. 2; A.D. Tussing,
"The Case for Bank Failure" (1967) 10 J.L Econ. 129; E.L Garrett, "The Modified Payoff of Failed
Banks: A Settlement Practice to Inject Market Discipline into the Commercial Banking System" (1987) 73
Virginia LR. 1349; and . Macey & G. Miller, "Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for
Bank Control" (1988) 88 CoL LR. 1153.
41
L Sprague, Bailout An Insider'sAccount of Bank Failuresand Rescues, (New York- Basic
Books, 1986) found that in 46 out of the 50 largest bank failures to 1985, no depositor suffered a loss,
whereas in 43 out of the 100 smallest bank failures prior to 1985, depositors' claims were dealt with by
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Federal government extension of de facto full insurance for
depositors has been arranged through two principal methods: (i) direct
financial assistance to faltering institutions, or (ii) purchase and
assumption transactions ("weekend mergers"), which involve the
purchase and assumption of the entire undertaking of the failed
institution by a stronger industry member, usually with some form of
government financial assistance. Since, in both cases, the assets of the
insolvent institution are never liquidated, uninsured depositors are
protected from experiencing losses upon failure. Nevertheless, the two
methods do differ in the disciplinary effect they have on the
institution's other stakeholders. Whereas all stakeholders of the failed
institution, at least in the short run, are protected by direct financial
assistance, only depositors and some creditors are protected by a
purchase and assumption transaction.43
The arguments for full insurance protection are rarely made on
the basis of the moral desirability of extending coverage to large,
sophisticated depositors. Rather, when explicit, they are advanced on
the basis of broad economic and political concerns, such as contagion
effects, protection of the public purse, and harm to stakeholders. The
common thread running through all of these arguments is the need to
preserve the distinctive nature of financial institutions and the viability
of the financial system.44
payoff, which implies at least some loss on uninsured amounts. For a discussion of the ethical and
efficiency impact of the selective use of closure policies, see Working Paper Series, "Issues in Financial
Regulation," Are Some Banks Too Large to Fail? Myth andReality (Working Paper No. WP-89-14) by
G. Kaufman (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1989); and Garrett, ibid note 40 at 1375-78.
42
Indeed, the Chairman of crnc, Ronald McKinlay, is on the public record as favouring such
transactions. See S. Gittins, "First City Deal Safest Option- epic Chief' The FinancialPost, (20 Jan.
1992) 3: "It's almost the rule that liquidation is the worst way to go, and it's better to have a troubled
institution taken over by somebody that's got both some credibility and financial muscle."
43 Invariably, a condition precedent for the use of a purchase and assumption transaction is that
senior management of the failed institution be removed and that the claims of shareholders and
subordinated creditors be extinguished. However, there are even exceptions to this general rule.
Subordinated creditors and shareholders in First City Trust were able to extract $34 million in
compensation from the purchaser, North American Life Assurance Co., of the institution's assets, even
though the transaction was facilitated by a $175 million loan from the CDIC and an additional
undertaking to absorb an additional $300 million of future losses in certain circumstances. (S. Gittins,
"cDncShores Up First City Deal" FinancialPost (17 Jan. 1992) 1.) The fact that this compensation was
in the form of twelve-year, non-interest-bearing, unsecured junior debentures of the successor institution
(so-called "hope certificates") largely explains the generosity of eic.
44 However, even those commentators arguing for special treatment of banks concede the
inevitability of bank failure. See, for instance, E. Corrigan, FinancialMarket Structure:A Longer View
(New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York,1987) at 11. See also, the Estey Report, supra note 19.
At 323, Estey argues that banks should be kept operating when their failure would have a "serious
impact upon the community or upon the Canadian banking system at home or abroad." However, at
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a) The contagion rationale
The most frequently invoked economic claim for the full
protection of depositors is based on the danger of "contagion" effects.
Essentially, proponents of this view argue that the failure of one
financial institution will, ceteris paribus, trigger the failure of other
institutions in the industry, and will impair the government's ability to
realize certain macroeconomic objectives. Most often, commentators are
concerned with the contractionary effect of multiple financial institution
failures on the money supply and the attendant inability of the
government to realize certain price and income objectives.' 5
Contagion effects can result from two wholly different types of
processes. The first process is informational in nature, and is based on
the information-generating effects of a failure. In this case, investors
with deposits in other institutions will use the failure event to reassess
the soundness of the institutions in which their investments are
currently deposited. The fact that an institution has failed could, for
instance, implicate the regulatory regime under which that institution
was chartered or the location and type of the assets in which the
institution invested. In either case, the fact of failure may provide a jolt
to investors who realize that their current investments may be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the failure will spawn a race to withdraw funds
from "similarly situated" institutions-even if the conclusions drawn by
investors respecting the implications of the initial insolvency are largely
erroneous. This is due to the strong (and, in some cases, perverse)
incentives operating upon depositors to pull their funds on even the
most remote possibility of failure. 46 In the absence of generous liquidity
assistance, a whole series of failures could follow from an initial failure.

267, he acknowledges the need to accept the inevitability of failure in the financial system.
45

H. Garten, "Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks" (1986) 4
Yale . of Reg. 129 at 160-63.
46

Once a firm becomes subject to rumours of failure, it is in the interests of depositors to pull their
funds out of that institution as quickly as possible so as to avoid bearing any share of the costs of
failure should the rumours be accurate. In this climate, extremely strong racing incentives prevail, which
undermines the stability of the financial system. In large part, the vulnerability of institutions to rumours
and innuendo relates to the concentration of the lending activities of financial intermediaries in asset
markets that are highly specialized. Inevitably, an en masse withdrawal of depositors' funds will require
the financial institution to recall a large proportion of its demand loans. Not surprisingly, borrowers are
bound to generate heavy losses for the institution as they sell off assets securing the loans from the
institution in extremely illiquid asset markets. This,in turn, converts a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis.
See, generally, D. Fischel, A. Rosenfield & R. Stillman, "The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies" (1987) 73 Virg. LR. 301 at 307-310; and Macey &Miller, sura note 40 at 1156-59.
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As a rationale for blanket assistance, the information-based
contagion argument is troubling. If, as is generally the case, market
pressure is thought to have some beneficial effect on the management
of financial institutions, then institutions must be free to suffer the
consequences of mass withdrawals based on new, accurate, albeit
harmful, information. Indeed, these pressures are no different from
those that impact on producers in a wide range of economic contexts.' 7
In this context, the appropriateness of counteracting the disciplinary
effect of bad news is deeply suspect. As the propensity to intervene
becomes widely known, investors will have less incentive to monitor
closely the status of the institutions to which they have lent money,
which will then increase the scope for shareholder and managerial risktaking, and ultimately, the breadth of institutional failure.
More difficult, however, is the case in which the information
that is disseminated is grossly inaccurate, and unfairly places a wellmanaged institution under intense market pressure. Here, the issue is
not whether some type of public intervention is merited, but the form
that intervention should take. As a first measure, regulators should
make public statements that explicitly address the status of the
embattled institution. Perhaps the credibility of these statements would
be enhanced if actual audited financial statements were released. If this
fails, the institution should be able to obtain temporary liquidity
assistance that Xrevents a massive sell-off of its assets at drastically
reduced prices. However, in order to ensure that such assistance is
furnished only to basically sound institutions, effective safeguards will
have to be devised.
The second process responsible for contagion effects is tied less
to informational mechanisms and is instead the result of myriad
interdependencies that exist among financial institutions in their day-today operations.
Perhaps the most straightforward of these
interdependencies are those that arise through the routine borrowing
and lending activities of financial institutions in the settlement and
interbank deposit market.49 Because financial institutions frequently
47
Publicly traded companies, for instance, are subject to discipline in capital markets through the
operation of the "Wall Street Rule," whereby aggrieved shareholders of poorly managed companies sell
their shares, consequently depreciating the market price of the company's equity.

48 G. Kaufman, "Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits and Costs" (Winter 1988) Cato J.559.
49

Fmancial institutions frequently hold investments, especially deposits, in each other. This
pattern is largely inspired by government regulation, which provides that a specified percentage of assets
be held in cash or equivalent reserves. Among permitted "equivalent" investments are deposits with
banks. Since these investments routinely pay interest in excess of other permitted investments, interbank
lending is an attractive investment strategy for financial institutions. The size of the interbank market
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lend money of varying terms to each other, the failure of any one
institution could impair the assets, and hence capital, of other
institutions, causing the collapse of the latter.50 Concern over this
phenomenon was successfully invoked by u.s. federal government
officials in the Continental Illinois bailout to justify protection to all
depositors. 5
The interdependence rationale, particularly in respect of the
support it has lent to those advocating complete financial protection for
depositors, has been criticized for the dubious empirical claims upon
which it relies. 52 For instance, staff members of the House Committee
examining the Continental Illinois failure argued that, of the 179
institutions identified by federal regulators as being vulnerable to failure
because of investments in the bank, only 28 were actually at serious risk,
providing support for the claim that the danger of widespread
systematic injury was greatly inflated.53
underscores its importance-well over $1 trillion in 1982 (data from the Bank for International
Settlements discussed in R.C. Bryant, InternationalFinancialIntermediation (Washington: Brookings
Institute, 1987) at 29). The principal critic of the adequacy of current payment and settlement
mechanisms is E. Gerald Corrigan, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Corrigan
has repeatedly expressed concern with the potential for a failure of a financial intermediary to affect
other institutions through the payments mechanism. See Corrigan, supra note 44. Risks to bank
solvency that are transmitted through the payments system are discussed by R. Clair, "Daylight
Overdrafts: Who Really Bears the Risk?" and G. Milano, "Payment System Risk: A Private Sector
View" c. 7 and 8 in C. England, ed., Governing Banking's Future: Markets Versus Regulation (Norwell,
Mass.: Kluwer, 1991).
50 Because the deposits of financial institutions are often obtained from other financial
institutions, the solvency of one often impacts directly on the solvency of others. In particular, if an
institution holding extensive deposits loaned by other institutions fails, the losses sustained by these
other institutions may be high enough to deplete required levels of capital, thereby forcing liquidation.
51
H. Foulkes, "The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The Rbscue of Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company" (1985) Annual Survey of American Law 137.
52
Benston et al, supra note 29 at 55-78. At 77, Benston states: "U.S. history suggests that runs on
individual banks or groups of banks only rarely spread to other banks that are not subject to the same
conditions that started the run, and that most bank runs have been contained by appropriate action,
with only minimal and short-lived adverse effects on national financial stability and economic activity."
53
The Foic predicted that the failure of Continental Illinois would cause the failure of 66 banks
(each of which had more than 100 per cent of its equity deposited in the bank) and would weaken and
possibly cause the failure of another 113 banks (each of which had between 50 and 100 per cent of its
equity invested in the bank). See memorandum of R. Shumway, Director of Division of Bank
Supervision to nDic Chairman Issac, "Exposure of Downstream Correspondent Banks to Continental
Illinois" (20 June 1984) (reprinted in Inquiry into ContinentalIllinois Corp. and ContinentalIllinois
National Bank; HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) at 599). See also testimony of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of Currency at 287.
However, as Foulkes, supra note 51, observes, there was considerable skepticism expressed regarding the
accuracy of these estimates by the staff of the House Committee (Staff of the House Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., Continental Illinois
National Bank Failure and its Potential Impact on Correspondent Banks (4 October 1984) (reprinted in
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Even assuming that interdependencies among financial
institutions do exist, which would allow a failure of one institution to
threaten others, it is not at all clear that complete depositor protection is
an appropriate policy response. As discussed in relation to the
information-based contagion rationale, although the extension of
complete depositor protection may appear to reduce the prospect of
destructive contagion effects, its suppression of market vigilance may in
fact increase substantially the actual incidence (hence, costs to society)
of failure." This is so despite the efforts of many commentators to
shroud financial institutions in a quasi-public veil.55 In these terms, the
potential for contagion effects generated by interdependencies could be
controlled by a number of different instruments. To the extent, for
instance, that potentially perverse interdependencies arise through
long-term interbank lending, effective portfolio restrictions limiting the
scope of this activity could be implemented. For short-term,
settlements-based exposure, the prescription is for more timely
settlement. With these ey ante controls, the exposure of the financial
system to an epidemic of failure should be contained.
b) Protecdonof thepublicpurse
Another economic rationale frequently invoked to support
wholesale assistance to depositors is based on preservation of public
finances. According to the proponents of this argument, it is cheaper
for the government to arrange for the purchase and assumption of
the assets of an institution (entailing full protection of depositor claims),
even if governmental financial support (in the form of cash infusions,
the House Hearings at 418)). At 145, Foulkes notes that if the benefits of formal deposit insurance
protection, the proceeds of a sale of Continentals assets and a decrease in overnight investments as the
crisis approached are taken into account, the Staff Committee predicted the failure of only 6 banks and
the serious weakening of another 22. If all of these banks failed, only $58 million would have been lost.
54
Surely this is one of the lessons to be learned from the savings and loan debacle in the United
States. G. Benston & G. Kaufman, "Understanding the Savings-and-Loan Debacle" (1990) 99 The
Public Interest 79 at 92.
55
This quasi-public role derives from the impact that decisions made in the banking sector can
have on broader public policy objectives, such as the control of the money supply or the allocation of
capital within the economy. See Corrigan, supra note 44 and discussion in the Estey Report, supra note
19 at 265, respecting the status of banks as quasi-public institutions. Nevertheless, as a number of
commentators have recently noted, the importance of the banking system, as measured in terms of the
percentage of capital it attracts in relation to other investment vehicles, mainly market intermediated
instruments, is dwindling. See R. Litan, The Revolution in U.S. Finance, (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1991). The contracting role of financial intermediaries certainly works to diminish the public
importance of these institutions.
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loan guarantees, and loan puts) is required. This is because the cost of
this assistance is perceived to be lower than the ultimate cost to the
insurer of liquidation.

6

Essentially, high liquidation costs derive from

defects in the process by which the assets of financial institutions are
transferred to suitable purchasers.

In a first-best world, the sale of assets of a failed institution
would be effected by an open, competitive auction process.5 7 To be
effective, such a process would require several conditions to be met: (i)
multiple, uncoordinated bidders must participate in the auction; (ii)
capital markets must work reasonably efficiently so that competent
bidders with high subjective valuations of the assets will have the ability,
not just the willingness, to pay; (iii) each bidder must be able to form
reasonably accurate assessments of the underlying value of the assets
subject to auction; and (iv) the process must be completed as soon as
possible after a regulatory finding of insolvency or impending insolvency
is made.s
At first blush, the prospects for an efficient auction model to

operate in the financial institutions context seem fairly limited. The
primary deficiency with the model is informational in nature. Because of
the very illiquid markets in which the lending activities of financial
intermediaries are concentrated, there are no ready market reference
56 Historically, in the United States, the decision as to how the assets of a failed bank are
disposed of has been governed by a statutory cost test that compares the magnitude of the cost to the
insurance fund of a standard liquidation with the costs of a purchase and assumption transaction (12
U.S.C. § 1823 (c) (1982)). However, the test is less restrictive than it would nppear because of discretion
on the part of the regulators to decide whether an institution is insolvent in the first place or "essential
to the community," and, therefore, subject to open bank assistance. See Garrett, supra note 40 at 135260 and J. Portis, "ruic's Powers After A Bank Failure" (1988) 65 Univ. Detroit LR. 259.
57
Macey & Miller (supra note 40 at 1187-91) are sensitive to the innate problems in using the
auction model in this setting, and recommend an open bidding process that would allow sufficient time
for bidders to prepare a bid. For a discussion of the role of auctions in achieving the privatization of
state owned assets in formerly command economies, see R. Daniels & R. Howse, "Reforming the Reform
Process: A Critique of Proposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe" [forthcoming]. For a
general discussion of the role of auctions, see C. Smith, Auctions: The Social Constructionof Value (New
York. The Free Press, 1989).
58
Because of the propensity of management and shareholders to engage in excessive risk-taking
on the eve of bankruptcy, government regulators will usually insist on the resignation of management
upon a finding of insolvency. (The perverse incentives of management and shareholders in prebankruptcy situations is discussed in G. Triantis, "Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect
Information" (1992) 21 J. Legal Stud. 225 at 256.) However, to the extent that the institution's managers
are replaced by government officials untutored in the management of private sector enterprise, the assets
of the institution will be subject to rapid depreciation. These problems are only partially ameliorated by
the appointment of interim receivers given the lack of strong external scrutiny imposed by government
officials. For a recent discussion of these problems, see Y. Yakabuski, "Standard Trust in Worse Shape
Than Liquidator Thought" The Toronto Star (10 August 1992) C1.
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points for lenders to use when assessing the existing value of the failed
institution's assets. 59 As a consequence, each bidder is required to
undertake a painstaking, in-depth examination of each of the assets in
the portfolio before making a bid. Typically, this will involve the actual
on-site inspection of the asset by a trained appraiser, who will be able to
assign a value to that asset based on familiarity with prevailing prices in
that asset market. Not surprisingly, when the number of assets in a
given portfolio is considered, the pre-acquisition investigation process
becomes an extremely costly exercise. In addition, since a bidder
cannot-assuming a competitive auction-be assured of actually
purchasing the assets, the recovery of the costs of pre-acquisition
search and analysis becomes speculative. The effect of such high upfront costs on the auction process is predictable: bidders will either
refrain from participating in the process at all, or deeply discount the
price they are willing to pay for the assets so as to provide a cushion to
protect them against the possibility of inflated appraisals. 60 In either case,
the integrity of the auction process is compromised.6'
Ironically, the favoured governmental response to infirmities in
the auction process does address the willingness to bid problem, but in a
way which erodes private incentives to manage the acquired assets
effectively. As Table 1 reveals, the cDic has frequently been forced to
provide loan guarantees and other financial inducements (Le., giving
the buyer the right to put the assets back to the insurer at some
stipulated period in the future for the purchase price) to buyers to
59
Of course, book value is of little use given the fact that most assets of a failed institution will
have declined from their historic acquisition value.
60
One of the ways in which Dic has attempted to lower the magnitude of these entry barriers is
by making available the results of the studies they or other regulators have conducted on the assets of
the failed institution prior to closure. Nevertheless, given the very subjective nature of the appraisal
process in highly specialized illiquid markets, bidders are often desirous of having the pre-bid
investigation conducted by their own appraisers. Further, even if the information collected by the
government is believed to be accurate, its utility may be undermined by the period of time that passes
between the filing of the appraisers' reports and the commencement of the auction. Governmental
willingness to disclose the results of these investigations may, therefore, provide only a weak subsidy to
potential bidders.
61

The high up-front costs involved in assessing the underlying value of a failed institution's assets

is not the only barrier impeding prospective bidders in the auction process. Governmental restrictions on
the eligibility of bidders (because, for instance, a bidder is linked to commercial enterprises, and is,
therefore, discouraged from owning a financial institution under federal rules) reduce the number of
prospective bidders. In Canada, this restriction means that only a small number of institutions will be
anxious to participate in the process. For a critique of the restriction on commercial and financial
linkages in Canada, see Conference on Deregulation and Reregulation, Crumbling Pillars: Creative
Destructionor CavalierDemolition(Working Paper) by T. Courchene (Lethbridge, Alberta: University
of Alberta, 1989).
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secure the completion of purchase and assumption transactions. The
rationale for such assistance is expressed in terms of its ability to remove
some of the debilitating uncertainty that prospective bidders face in
valuing assets subject to auction. Nevertheless, by protecting acquirers
from the risks of an erroneous valuation, the government commits two
serious errors. First, it bestows an undeserved windfall on acquiring
institutions that protects them from any depreciation in the value of the
acquired assets, even when the depreciation is not in any way related to
faulty appraisal. 62 Second, in comparison to the situation that would
result if the acquiring institution were required to bear the full
downside risks of its investment, the extension of government financial
assistance dulls the incentive for the acquirer to manage the assets
effectively. It is far easier for the institution to put the asset back to the
government than to expend resources in a cost-justified work-out.6 In
this respect, the solution to the problems created by the perverse
incentives of deposit insurance does little more than reintroduce many
of the most vexing incentive problems under a different guise.

62 For instance, an institution that successfully acquires assets from a failed institution, for
example, real estate, and later suffers a loss on that investment that can be traced to secular market
forces (for example, high interest rates and deflation) should not be entitled to compensation from the
government.
63
This problem has arisen recently in the acquisition of the "healthy" assets of Standard Trust by
Laurentian Bank. By the end of the first year, more than one third of the assets had been put back to
the government. See Yakabuski, supranote 58.
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c) Protectionof stakeholders
It is a striking feature of the argument in support of the
adoption of policies which have the effect of protecting uninsured
depositors against the risk of institutional failure that this group is
seldom identified as the intended beneficiaries of these policies. Instead,
attention is usually focused on other stakeholder groups, namely,
employees, suppliers, customers (borrowers and lenders), and
communities.6 ' For employees, suppliers, and communities, the claim in
favour of protection differs little from that made in the context of
commercial companies undergoing bankruptcy. Stripped to essentials,
the stakeholder protection argument turns on the highly specialized
investments (usually in the nature of human capital) that stakeholders
have made in their corporations.6s Because these investments are not
easily diversified by stakeholders, and because they are often made on
the basis of erroneous information, stakeholders will suffer serious
personal harms when bankruptcy (or a~y other event which radically
upsets pre-existing expectations) occurs.
As in the case of failures of commercial companies, the
stakeholder claim suffers from several innate frailties. At an empirical
level, it has not been clearly established that commercial failures will, in all
cases, irreparably injure stakeholders. 67 A finding of injury will depend
on the alternative opportunities available to the displaced stakeholder,
and on the costs of exploiting those opportunities. Obviously, some
stakeholders (for example, older, unskilled workers located in onecompany towns) will be severely affected by bankruptcy, while other
workers (for example, younger, skilled workers located in population

64 See, generally, G. Benston & G. Kaufman, Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository
Institutions:PastPolicies and Current Options (Monograph Series in Finance and Economics) (New
York: Salamon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, 1988).
65 For a full elaboration of this claim in the commercial context, see R.J. Daniels, "Mergers and
Acquisitions and the Public Interest: Don't Shoot the Messenger" in L Waverman, ed., Corporate
Globalization Through Mergers and Acquisitions (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1991) 195 and
R.J. Daniels "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate?" U.T.LJ.
[forthcoming] [hereinafter "Stakeholders and Takeovers"].
66

"Stakeholders and Takeovers," ibkd
This argument is developed by M. Trebilcock et al., The PoliticalEconomy ofBusiness Bailouts
(Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985) c. 3. See also Royal Commission on the Economic Union
and Development Prospects for Canada, The Political Economy of Economic Adjustment
(Background Papers, vol. 8) by M. Trebilcock (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) c. 1; and
"Stakeholders and Takeovers," ibid 65.
67
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centres with myriad employment options) may escape the failure with
little long-term damage.
However, even assuming that some groups of stakeholders are
injured by bankruptcies, it does not necessarily follow that the state
should intervene to limit the impact of these transactions.
Unfortunately, the lifeblood of a market economy is dislocation and
adjustment (Schumpeter's gale of creative destruction).6 Without the
chaos of restructuring activity, the ability of the market to move
resources to their highest-valued use would be impaired. In other
words, bankruptcy signals only the death of companies, it does not
signal death of the human and physical resources that have fuelled
their activities. In these circumstances, a better way to deal with the
tragic dislocations occurring in the wake of painful restructuring activity
would be to provide humane and timely assistance to deserving
stakeholders through generous state-backed adjustment schemes. 69
So far the claim in favour of protection for stakeholders in the
context of financial institution failure has differed little from the more
general claim made by stakeholder proponents in the commercial setting.
Quite simply, the fact that a financial institution had failed adds little
force to the case for stakeholder protection."0
Most advocates of specialized protection for financial institutions
concede this point, but then argue that the case for special protection
does differ when the damage to the interests of borrowers is
considered. 7' This damage ranges from benign to severe. At the benign
end of the continuum, the failure of an institution may disrupt some of
the specialized relationships that have been created between borrowers
and the failed institution's employees. Assuming that responsibility for
loan monitoring is transferred to another institution upon the demise
of the original lender, borrowers will be forced to make additional
expenditures on activities designed to familiarize the lender with the
borrowers' operations and creditworthiness. For most borrowers,
these costs are significant mainly for their annoyance value. At the
severe end of the continuum, however, failure may result in the
68 Schumpeter, supra note 5 at 87.
69
The argument in favour of generalized adjustment schemes is made powerfully by M. Trebilcock
in The PoliticalEconomy of Economic Adjustment, supra note 67. See also M. Trebilcock et al, Trade
and Transitions:A ComparativeAnalysis ofAdjustment Policies (London: Routledge, 1990) c. 6.
70 As Horvitz has observed, "[t]he failure of the textile mill in a one-mill New England town is
almost certainly a greater community disaster than the failure of the local bank in a one-bank town."
P.M. Horvitz, "Simulating Bank Competition Through Regulatory Action" (1965) 20 J. Fin. 1 at 3.
711 am grateful to Jim Ballie for alerting me to this argument.
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immediate termination of the borrower's loans, and precipitate the
collapse of the borrower's activities or investments. It is concern over
this scenario that drives governmental efforts to salvage financial
institutions. By arranging for the purchase and assumption of the
entire undertaking of the failed institution, borrowers can be assured
that their loans will not be called prematurely, and that their highly
personalized lending relationships will be maintained.72
There is little question that premature disruption or, more
severely, termination of lending relationships can impose extreme
hardship on borrowers, and that this hardship can translate into large
scale macroeconomic woes. Nevertheless, as in the case of other
stakeholders, the question is not so much one of the legitimacy of
protection, but the means of achieving it. Instead of relying on
instruments which generate large on-budget expenditures and create
debilitating moral hazard problems, governments should invoke a
variety of other, more finely honed, instruments to achieve their goals.
In the case of borrowers, a policy bundle that involves a mixture of
strengthened consumer protection-type legislation for borrowers,
combined with more liberal use of macroeconomic stimulants, may well
suffice to address the most serious threats to global economic welfare.
4. Summary-compensating for perverse policy and the destructive
effect of the regulatory ratchet
In this section, the corrosive effects of two of the core features
of financial institution regulation in Canada-flat-rate based depositor
insurance and defacto full deposit insurance-on the goals of assuring
the solvency and soundness of financial institutions were emphasized.
By sterilizing depositor incentives for effective monitoring, the current
72 Some commentators have questioned the severity of the disruption to stakeholders from a
failure. See, for instance, G. Benston & G. Kaufman, "Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository
Institutions: Past Policies and Current Options" (Staff Memorandum 88-1 of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago). The authors state at 14, "[tlhus, bank failures generally do not leave communities without
banking facilities. Rather, customers are likely to face banks under different managements and
ownerships. This may cause some hardships, but these should not be overly severe." Of course, assuming
a climate of stable or decreasing interest rates, an acquiring institution will have little incentive to recall
the fixed rate loans of a borrower having demonstrated a stable history of credit service. In addition, if
the outstanding loans are at floating rates of interest, the direction of interest rate movements should
have no impact whatsoever. If, however, the successor institution to a failed bank decides to accelerate
loan repayments under its strict contractual rights, a variety of judicial and legislative safeguards will be

triggered. See, for instance, notice requirement under s. 244 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
(R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3); and Ronald Elwyn Listerv. Dunlop CanadaLtd. (1982) 135 D.LR.(3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
(requirement of reasonable period of notice before enforcing security interest after demand made).
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system of regulation encourages shareholders and managers of
regulated institutions to engage in excessive levels of risk taking which in
the long run, increases the probability, and hence the total costs to
society, of institutional failure. Nevertheless, despite these infirmities,
public decision makers have been unable to abandon their commitment
to market suppressing policies. Both in Canada and the United States,
flat-rate based deposit insurance and complete protection for depositors
in the event of failure, are concepts which have become enshrined in
the architecture of regulation. Indeed, close inspection of Bill C-48, the
federal government's recent amendments to the cmcAct, shows the
resiliency of the commitment to these policies. 7
The inevitable effect of continued allegiance to flat-rate based
deposit insurance and de facto full protection for depositors is an
increase in the burden placed on government regulators in the
vindication of their safety and soundness mandate. Quite simply,
regulation has to work harder to compensate for the rational apathy of
depositors and the heightened opportunism of insiders of financial
institutions. Inevitably, working harder means the promulgation of
more obtrusive forms of regulation-the so-called regulatory ratchet.7 '
The regulatory ratchet is troubling not only for its capacity to erode the
sphere devoted to individual liberty in the modem state, but also for its
perverse effect on market conduct. Because governments are
inherently less competent than market actors in responding to financial
incentives, institutions will have more scope for opportunistic risk taking
than would be found in a setting of vigorous market oversight.75

73
Bill C-48, An Act to amend the CanadaDeposit Insurance CorporationAct and to amend other
Acts in consequence thereof,3d Sess, 34th Parl., 1992 was the progeny of the Estey Repores (supra note
19 at 323-340) recommendation that federal regulators be given enhanced powers to seize and
restructure a troubled institution well in advance of actual failure. Embedded in Bill C-48 is a
preference for transactions which are designed to protect the going concern value of failing institutions,
which, whether intentionally or not, has the effect of conferring extensive protection to uninsured
depositors (as well as unsecured creditors). This point was elegantly made by J. Bailie and D. Baird in

correspondence dated March 2,1992 to the Standing Committee on Finance of the House of Commons

(Chain Hon. Murray Dorin).
74

Kane (1985), supra note 29.

75 Supra note 10.
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B. Market Impediments and their Impact on the Competitive Federalism
Model
The claim that government regulation has spawned a series of
limitations on the effectiveness of market forces is well known. More
novel, however, is the claim that these market-suppressing policies also
have profound and detrimental effects on the incentives of
governmental actors within a federal structure. In particular, as Miller,
and Butler and Macey have argued, these policies can cause lower-level
governments (that is, states and provinces) to produce regulations that
are less responsible than would be observed in a setting characterized
by different policy commitments.7 6 This is attributable to the desire of
bureaucrats and politicians in lower-level governments to use solvency
regulation of financial institutions as a vehicle for vindicating myriad
objectives unrelated to solvency, and the scope that the current regime
allows for governments to pursue these extraneous goals with
impunity.
In the main, the source of these problems lies in the ability of
provinces to charter loan and trust companies without having to
assume any of the financial costs that are generated when one of these
institutions fails. 77 Instead, the full brunt of liability is borne by the
76

See G. Miller, "The Future of the Dual Banking System" (1987) 53 Brooklyn LRev. 1; and H.N.
Butler & J.R. Macey, "The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System" (1988) 73 Cornell LR.
677. In contrast, however, see Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 46 at 335: "Although the
existence of twin sets of regulators will inevitably impose some duplication costs, the race to the bottom
argument lacks merit." See also K. Scott, "The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation" (1977) 30 Stan. LL 1 for a more balanced assessment of the benefits and costs of the dual
banking system.
77 Interestingly, to the extent that the insurance and regulatory functions of the federal
government are not completely fused in one agency of government, there may be scope for externalities
to arise within one level of government. Indeed, the Estey Report recommended a consolidation of the
supervision and insurance functions of financial regulation into one federal agency in order to
capitalize on the natural instinct of the insurer to minimize the risks of failure. (Estey Report, spra note
19 at 277). However, since the most onerous ownership and transfer restrictions are contained in federal
legislation, and these restrictions erode the commitment of managers to the goal of shareholder wealth
maximization, the demand by federally chartered institutions for legislation conducive to excessive risk
taking is likely not as intense as that expressed by provincially chartered institutions. This is because
when ownership and management functions are severed, and ownership is widely dispersed,
managements natural risk aversion will thwart the adoption of strategies that increase shareholder
wealth through enhanced risk assumption. (See supra note 18 and accompanying text.) Inter-agency
competition in the same level of government has also been observed in the United States, and has,
predictably, supported calls for consolidation of regulation in one federal agency. See, for instance, 3.
Robertson, "Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification" (1966) 31 L & Contemp. Prob.
673; and S. Friedman & C. Friesen, "A New Paradigm For Financial Regulation: Getting From Here to
There" (1984) 43 Maryland LR. 413.
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federal government in its capacity as national deposit insurer. To the
extent that demands have been placed on the cnic that exceed its
available funds, the federal government, rather than requiring the aIc
to obtain additional funds from the industry, will cover the shortfall
itself by way of loans from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. However,
while the federal government is the residual risk bearer for the costs
occasioned by default of all insured institutions, its powers of regulation
have traditionally been limited to those institutions that it charters. As a
consequence, provincial governments-with few modest
exceptions--are able to charter and regulate financial institutions
without having to assume any responsibility for failure."
The knowledge that the federal government is financially liable in
the event of a failure undermines the incentive for provincial regulators
to create a regulatory regime that imposes appropriate constraints on
industry behaviour. This is a particularly serious defect given the need
for second generation financial regulation to serve as a corrective for
the perverse incentives introduced by the commitment to flat-rate based
insurance and complete protection for depositors. In its most benign
form, the regulatory product produced by provincial politicians will
simply be indifferent to the costs that lenient regulation can impose on
the federal government. However, when one considers the full range
of benefits that accrue to provincial politicians and bureaucrats as a
result of an indigenous financial industry, the prospects for more active
exploitation of the federal government's insurance obligation are
heightened.
What form do these benefits take? Disregarding the issue of
the personal benefits that provincial bureaucrats and politicians might
reap from financial regulation,80 the most obvious source of gain derives
78 In the Greymac Affair, the Ontario government was held responsible for the costs of

liquidation. The Province was also required to contribute to the bail-out of Financial Trustco.
(Information provided by Ontario regulators).
79

Although Quebec has a separate deposit insurance scheme--the Quebec Deposit Insurance
Board (QDm)-its financial responsibility extends only to Quebec deposits. Consequently, the failure of
a Quebec chartered institution with extensive deposits outside of the province would have little
disciplinary effect on provincial regulators. (The Agreement outlining the respective roles of cDic and
QDIB (dated December 23,1968) is discussed in the Annual Report of anc for the year ended December
31,1980 at 13.)
80 Bureaucrats and politicians may desire to increase their share of the financial institution
regulation market because of the personal benefits they receive in the form of enhanced prestige and
power that comes from regulating a powerful industry. According to Butler and Macey, supra note 76,
it is the rents accruing to government officials, both elected and unelected, that is the central motivating
factor behind the desire of governments to protect or expand their share of the market for financial
regulation. The more complex and impenetrable the process is to outsiders, the greater the scope for
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from the ability of provincial officials to encourage indigenous
institutions to fund certain favoured industrial policy projects, thereby
obviating an on-budget expenditu're. s' The ability to channel these
funds into politically desired uses is valuable, given the increasing fiscal
pressure that contemporary governments are under to balance their
budgets.8 2 These projects can take a variety of forms, from large-scale
infra structural investments (hydro generation plants, roads, etc.) to
other, less foundational applications (commercial real estate, equity for
local industrial companies, eta). Although the precise mix of projects
varies from province to province, they all share one basic characteristic:
in the absence of an embedded public subsidy furnished by the federal
government, provincial financial institutions would be constrained by
market forces from investing in them.
Why would provincially chartered institutions be willing to invest
in projects that would be shunned in a world of full cost internalization?
One possibility is that governmental powers of persuasion are more
effective when that government also happens to be the regulator
charged with supervising the solvency of chartered institutions. Under
this scenario, the owners of financial institutions cave in to both overt
and subtle forms of governmental pressure to finance favoured
activities. A failure to do so risks the opprobrium of the regulator,
which, in a regime characterized by considerable discretion, may inflict
great costs on the institution in the long run. The difficulty, however,
with the scenario is its crude, overly cynical view of the regulatory
process. Most financial institution regulators are dedicated to faithful
enforcement of the spirit of solvency and soundness regulation, and
would, therefore, not be predisposed to penalizing institutions for
failure to follow the whims of the political branch of government.
government discretion, and the greater the ability of officials to extract rents.
81 Quebec has placed greatest emphasis on utilizing indigenous sources of capital to achieve
industrial policy objectives. See A. Saumier, "Musings on Quebec Inc." in T. Courchene, ed., Quebec
Inc.: Foreign Takeovers, CompetitionlMergerPolicy and UniversalBanking (Kingston: Queen's School
of Policy Studies, 1990) c. 3 (discusses the role that leading financial institutions within Quebec played in
formulating an industrial policy programme for the province in the 1980s); and T. Courchene, supra note
61. For a careful critique of the impact of Quebec Inc. on the formation of a national economic union,
see Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Economic
Regulation and the FederalSystem (Background Papers, Vol. 42) by R. Schultz & A. Alexandroff
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 132-37.
82
In Canada, fiscal pressure has been greatest for lower-level governments. R. Boadway has
argued that this is largely the result of a reduction in the level of subsidies transferred by the federal
government to the provinces in support of various shared cost programmes. See Public Policy
Workshop, Shaping Canada'sFuture Together: One Economist'sReflections (Working Paper) by R.
Boadway (Toronto: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1992).
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A more likely explanation lies in the capacity of the provincial
legislature to entice institutions to undertake these investments, but on
terms that enable lending institutions to increase their risk taking. Given
that one of the central tasks of provincial safety and soundness
regulation is to temper many of the perverse incentives unleashed by
flat-rate based deposit insurance and bank closure policies, legislatures
can, by judicious use of portfolio rules, carve out occasions for
opportunistic risk-taking in areas that coincide with provincial industrial
policy objectives. Thus, by lending in areas deemed desirable by
provincial governments, both the province and the owners of
provincially chartered institutions will be able to exploit the benefits of
subsidized debt at the expense of the federal government. An extreme
example of this activity is furnished by the disproportionately high levels
of investment that American savings and loan corporations made in
regionally concentrated commercial real estate loans during the 1980s.83
Even though these investments were extremely risky (as the collapse of
the industry has shown), the industry was permitted (even
encouraged) to make them by complicitous state officials anxious to
reap the benefits that such lending would produce.8 ' And, as in the
Canadian case, it was the federal government as residual insurer who
ended up shouldering the financial fallout from this activity.
IV. THE EQUALS APPROACH AND THE DEMISE OF
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
As long as market-suppressing policies remain a keystone of the
Canadian regulatory regime, the prospects for the production of
optimal legislation through competitive federalism are bleak. In addition,
given the external costs imposed on the federal government through
the concerted action of provincial governments and industry actors,
financial institution regulation will remain inimical to harmonious federalprovincial interaction. This is especially so when the magnitude of these
costs is considered. For example, the bail-out of the Canadian
Commercial Bank (CCB) and Northland banks generated costs for cnxc
in excess of $500 million, an amount that vastly exceeds the magnitude

83

Horvitz, supra note 70 and Benston & Kaufman, supra note 72.
84 These benefits range from subsidized commercial premises to the desirable employment effects of
real estate construction.
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of most government led bail-outs of commercial firms.85
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scope of federal government responsibility under this system, it is simply
inconceivable that Ottawa will continue to countenance the
perpetuation of a system in which it is forced to underwrite the selfserving activities of provincial governments and industry shareholders
on a virtually open-ended basis.
Indeed, interviews with both federal and provincial financial
regulators confirm the growing penetration of the provincial regulatory
sphere by both the CDic and the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (osFi). 8 6 In the case of the c ic the expansion of
jurisdiction is easily accommodated by the Corporation's statutory
enabling authority, and by the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible,
to separate insurance from regulatory functions.88
Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the most ambitious incursion into
the regulatory domain of the provinces was not launched by Ottawa,
but by Ontario in its widely condemned 1987 "Equals Approach."8 9
85

See appendix to chapter I of Trebilcock et a., The PoliticalEconomy of Business Bailouts,
supra note 67.
86
Although osFi is charged with supervising federally chartered institutions, many of its regulatory
initiatives (for example, mandating various investment standards pertaining to, interalia, mortgage
backed securities and appropriate levels of commercial loans) have influenced provincial regulators in
their supervision of provincial institutions.
87

Cursory inspection of CDc's enabling legislation (the At,supra note 25) reveals extensive
statutory scope for the insurance corporation to regulate the day-to-day affairs of provincial
institutions once theyjoin the fund. See s. 7(b): "The objects of the corporation are to be instrumental
in the promotion of standards of sound business and financial practices for member institutions..."; s.
11(2)(e): "The board may make by-laws ...
prescribing standards of sound business and financial
practices for member institutions"; s. 17(b): "On application by a ...
provincial institution, the
Corporation may insure the deposits held with the institution to the extent and in the manner provided
in this Act and the by-laws, if...
the institution agrees, in carrying on its business, not to exercise powers
substantially different from the powers exercisable by a [federal] trust company ...
and a [federal] loan
company ..."; and s. 28, which empowers the cic to make annual inspections of provincial member
institutions. Interviews with provincial and federal officials confirmed the growing role of the cDic in
regulation of provincial institutions.
88 After all, the best way to protect the deposit insurance fund from unanticipated losses is to
ensure that member institutions are maintained in a safe and sound condition.
89

The Equals Approach was contained in the Province's 1987 modernization of its loan and trust
regulation (Bill 116). Critics of the initiative include L Pelly, "Harmonization: A Federal Perspective"
(Prepared speech at the Institute for International Research Conference on the New Financial Services
Regulation, 25 February 1992): "While the trust and loan companies may be the main victims of the lack
of uniformity, the principal perpetrator of the injustice is the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct (1987) of
Ontario"(at 3). See also J. Chertkow, "Worst Among Equals: An Analysis of Ontario's Equals
Approach" (Address to the Canadian Institute, 27 February 1989) [unpublished]; J.Ziegel, "The
Regulatory Evolution: Is there Light at the End of the Tunnel" (Prepared Remarks for Insight
Conference on Financial Services Reform, 7-8 April 1992); and Senate Standing Committee on Banking,
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Essentially, the Equals Approach requires any extra-provincially
incorporated loan and trust corporation wishing to carry on business in
Ontario to agree to comply with the core regulatory features of Bill 116

By
before being granted a licence to operate in the province.9
mandating compliance with Ontario's standards for appropriate capital
levels, permitted investments, self-dealing restrictions, reporting

requirements, and corporate governance structures, the Equals
Approach all but nullifies the chartering jurisdiction's loan and trust
legislation to the extent that its provisions are more lenient than
comparable provisions in Ontario. Since virtually all Canadian loan and
trust companies raise at least a portion of their funds from Ontario
depositors, this enactment means that the ambit of Ontario regulation
now extends to the activities of virtually all Canadian loan and trust
companies.
The impact of the Equals Approach on the competitive
federalism model is obvious and profound: by insisting that all
institutions operating in Ontario comply with Bill 116, the gains from

jurisdictional shopping are effectively obliterated. For any institution
contemplating activity in Ontario, the Equals Approach means that a
non-Ontario charter will only invite additional costs in the form of
compliance with duplicative and, in some cases, contradictory legislation,
with few compensating benefits. 9'

As a consequence, the only real

Trade and Commerce, Canada1992: Toward a NationalMarket in FinancialServices (Ottawa: The
Committee, 1990). (Because of the Equals Approach, "Ontario regulation and supervision effectively
dominates the trust industry, at least for those institutions that wish to access the Ontario market. The
Committee's view is that this is unacceptable and must come to an end" (at 72)).
90 Unfortunately, however, the courts have not developed a consistent line of jurisprudence
respecting what, in fact, constitutes conduct that is so severe as to sterilize federal corporations.
Curiously, appellate courts have held that a range of seemingly obtrusive provincial actions, such as
expropriation of substantially all of the assets of the corporate undertaking and extensive restrictions
on capital raising, are not colourable under the sterilization doctrine. Despite these traditional
authorities, it is arguable that if the constitutionality of an initiative like the Equals Approach were
tested by a modem court, it may be found ultra vires the provinces either on the basis of its destructive
effects on interprovincial trade and commerce (trenching on the federal government's s. 91(2)
jurisdiction) or on the basis of its deleterious effects on extraprovincial interests. This argument is
developed further in RJ. Daniels, "Breaking the Logjam: Proposals for Moving Beyond the Equals
Approach" (1993) 22 C.B.LJ. 132.
91 The violence that overlapping, contradictory legislation has inflicted on the vitality of the
competitive model should not obscure an appreciation of the various disabilities that industry members
face in undertaking their normal course of business activities. First, with the defacto regulatory regime
stitched together from the laws of a number of different jurisdictions, the underlying coherence of
regulation will be compromised. Obviously, such a "mix and match" system will lack the rigour or
legitimacy of a regulatory regime that is the by-product of extensive legislative investigation and
deliberation.
Second, because the only safe way to avoid prosecution is by complying with the jurisdiction
having the most onerous standards, the regulatory regime that actually governs the conduct of
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option for institutions aspiring to enter the Ontario market is to obtain
an Ontario charter. And so, in lieu of the competitive provision of
legislation, monopoly provision has been unilaterally substituted.
What motivated the Ontario government to fire the shot that
marked the end of competitive federalism in the loan and trust
area-especially, since it was the federal government that had the most
to lose from the continuation of subsidized, provincial risk-taking? The
standard explanation offered by Ontario regulators is that the initiative
was designed to limit the scope for risk taking by extraprovincially
incorporated institutions, most of whom raise the lion's share of their

regulatees will consist of the most restrictive standards of each of the regulating jurisdictions, raising
troubling fairness concerns. This concern is heightened when the scope for significant and legitimate
differences in the approach taken by regulators to achieve safety and soundness goals in the realm of
financial institution regulation is acknowledged. Regulators committed, for instance, to a system of
command-based regulation may eschew reliance on internal and external governance controls,
preferring instead to rely on an extensive menu of conduct-specific directives, while regulators committed
to incentive-based regulation may take the opposite stance. For a discussion of the differences between
command and market or incentive based regulation, see R. Howse, "Retrenchment, Reform or
Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State" (1993) 31 Alta. L.Rev.
455. However, if an institution is forced to comply with the most onerous standards of each jurisdiction's
regime, it will be precluded from availing itself of the offsets available under each regime, which will place
it at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to other institutions regulated by a single jurisdiction.
Third, the actual costs of compliance will be increased for institutions subject to control by
multiple jurisdictions. These costs range on a continuum from the trivial to the severe. At one end, the
costs of duplicative regulation may be relatively trivial, and be distinguished mostly by its annoyance
value. This occurs when the content of regulations does not vary much from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
and the only real burden of multiple regulation relates to the modification of a standard compliance
strategy, for example, the filing of essentially similar information across different jurisdictions. At the
other end of the continuum, however, the transaction costs of multiple jurisdictional activity may be so
severe as to actually deter the consummation of value-increasing transactions. This occurs when
conduct deemed permissible by one jurisdiction is expressly prohibited by another. In between these two
poles is conduct which contravenes the requirements of one of the regulating jurisdictions, but which
that jurisdiction may permit as a result of lobbying by the affected institution and, perhaps, a
commitment by that institution to modify certain activities. Of course, neither of these options is without
cost to the institution, and may, at the margin, dissuade the institution from actually undertaking the
activity. Of course, to the extent that jurisdictional barriers deter multi-jurisdictional activity, costefficient diversification may be hobbled, thereby impairing the welfare of the institution's investors (both
depositors and shareholders).
A fourth and final defect in a system of multiple, diffused regulation is the erosion of rule of law
and public accountability values, both of which lie at the heart of democratic systems of government.
This erosion derives from the inevitable compromises to which regulators will have to agree in order to
make a system of conflicting laws work. Yet, because mutual adjustment in the laws enforced by
regulating jurisdictions is done on a non-transparent basis involving the exercise of considerable
discretion, the ability of regulatees to participate in the rule-making process, and then to know with
certainty the identity of the laws that will actually be enforced by regulators, is compromised. Some of
the core tenets of democratic government, are therefore violated and the prospects for arbitrary and
uncontrolled exercises of regulatory authority are greatly increased. (See Janisch, supra note 35).
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funds from Ontario depositors. 92

Under this view, the intended

beneficiary of the Equals Approach was the Ontario depositor. By
insisting that extraprovincially incorporated institutions abide by Ontario

laws, the Ontario government sought to reduce the likelihood that
these institutions would fail, and take the funds of Ontario depositors'

down with them. As such, the Equals Approach can be defended
simply on 93the basis that it is nothing more than consumer protection

legislation.

Nevertheless, despite the surface plausibility of such an
account, it suffers from several deficiencies. First, as an empirical matter,
the degree of chartering activity undertaken by other provinces is quite
marginal, and would not appear to pose a serious threat to Ontario

citizens.9
Second, given the extensive formal and informal protection
offered by the federal government to insured and uninsured
depositors, the scope for legitimate concern over the welfare of
depositors of failed institutions is quite limited. This is particularly so
when decisions respecting the breadth of assistance to depositors are
undertaken by the federal government-not the provincial chartering

government-upon failure.

Further, even if there are grounds for

92

Ontario depositors provide loans and trusts registered in Ontario with 60 per cent of all their
deposits (B. Cass, "Complying With the New Financial Services Regulations, Identifying Emerging
Market Opportunities, Regulation and Harmonization" (Speech delivered at The Institute for
International Research, 25 February 1992) at 9).
93

]bid.

94 For instance, in 1989, most of the trust companies incorporated in Canada were chartered with
the federal government (56 companies having 85 per cent of the total cDic insured deposits), with
Ontario having 17 firms comprising 10.7 per cent of total industry deposits. Significantly, Quebec aside,
there were only 10 institutions chartered in the remaining provinces (3 in Alberta, 1 in British Columbia, 2
in Manitoba, 1 in Nova Scotia, and 2 in Saskatchewan), and the combined insured assets of these
institutions was only 3.4 per cent of the total industry's. (I am indebted to J. Lanthier of CDiC for the
industry data.) These data reveal in quite arresting terms the fact that, contrary to the claims made by
Ontario, the thrust of the Equals Approach is aimed not at provincially chartered institutions outside of
Ontario, but at federally chartered institutions and their investors. That is, Ontario, which enjoys the
patronage of firms comprising only 10.7 per cent of the total industry's assets, is setting the regulatory
agenda for the federal government, which enjoys almost eight times that amount. Given the almost
exclusive financial responsibility that the federal government bears for the failure of financial
institutions, the necessity, indeed, legitimacy, of Ontario intervening to protect depositors (meaning the
federal deposit insurance fund) from irresponsible federal legislation is, to say the least, curious.
95 As a consequence, the danger of discriminatory treatment of provincial and extra-provincial
depositors upon a failure is substantially reduced. The potential for discriminatory treatment of resident
and non-resident investors by a chartering province is more than an academic possibility. Following the
collapse of the Principal group of companies in 1987, the Alberta government (which had granted the
companies a charter under provincial investment contracts legislation) offered compensation that was
proportionate only to the amount of money lost by Alberta residents. Selective treatment of investors
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concern over the status of uninsured depositors, the suitability
of
6
intervening to protect them is, as argued earlier, highly suspect.
Third, even if one provisionally concedes the possibility that the
welfare of depositors is actually at risk froni the actions of opportunistic
owners of extra-provincially chartered institutions, it is a matter of some
doubt whether the mere enforcement of stringent regulatory
standards will, in the absence of an integrated, closely coordinated
system of supervision, be capable of deterring irresponsible behaviour.
Instead, the effect of the Equals Approach may well be to implicate the
integrity of the Ontario regulatory regime each and every time an
extra-provincially regulated institution fails, without having any
meaningful deterrent impact on opportunistic institutional behaviour.9

In view of these problems, the motives fuelling the province's
adoption of the Equals Approach are somewhat mysterious. Although
it could be argued that the policy is designed to shield provincial
regulators from the political fallout of an institutional failure-even for a
company chartered elsewhere-the fact that the Equals Approach
increases the effective scope and depth of regulatory responsibility
would appear to increase, rather than decrease, the exposure of
provincial officials to a charge of regulatory misfeasance.
Possibly, the answer lies in the desire of Ontario regulators to
maintain the province's traditional share of the financial institution
regulation market. Under this scenario, it could be argued that
Ontario recognized that the adoption of a more stringent regulatory
regime would, in the absence of some external constraint, provoke a
wholesale exodus of institutions from Ontario to other, more lenient
jurisdictions. Such an exodus would reduce the individual welfare of
provincial bureaucrats charged with the administration of loan and
trust regulation, and also reduce the province's ability to effect any
influence over indigenous capital allocation. By adopting the Equals

was designed to place pressure on other provinces to make their own Principal investors whole. See
"Playing Regulatory Catch-Up in the Wake of the Code Report" FinancialTunes (24 July 1989) 36.
Indeed, the strategy worked. See, for instance K. Howlett, "BC Will Payout $25 Million in Principal
Compensation" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (23 September 1989) B-L
96
As mentioned earlier, the federal government has usually intervened to protect all depositors in
a failed institution. However, it has not always done so, leaving open the possibility that in some
failures, uninsured depositors will actually suffer a loss on their investment. See Table 1,above.
97
The willingness of non-chartering provinces to compensate resident investors for losses sustained
on their investment in the Principal Group followed from reports by provincial ombudsmen of provincial
regulatory failure---even though the regulatory regime constructed by the host provinces was fairly
shallow (Howlett, supra note 95). The intense public pressure placed on governments following the
failure of an institution is discussed by McGuinness & Abrams, supra note 19 at 323.
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Approach, the province effectively negated any incentives for companies
to migrate, thereby preserving the province's market share.98
V. A PLAN FOR REVERSING THE EQUALS APPROACH AND
FOR REVIVING COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
The revival of Canadian federalism in the area of financial
institutions regulation calls out for immediate and bold reform. While
these reforms should have as their first priority the unravelling of
Ontario's Equals Approach, they should not be aimed at restoring the
environment that led to its adoption. It is neither realistic nor desirable
that a regime which saddled the federal government with the full costs
of failure of provincially chartered financial institutions, be resurrected.
In a first-best world, market-suppressing governmental policies
should be reformed so that greater discipline is brought to bear on the
shareholders and managers of financial institutions, thereby
attenuating the risk of loss to the federal government. In the main,
enhanced market vigilance could be achieved by the federal
government's abandoning its commitment to the twin policies of flat-rate
based deposit insurance and full protection to depositors upon
institutional failure. 99 In terms of the former-reform of deposit
insurance regulation-policy analysts have advocated the adoption of
changes to the existing scheme of deposit insurance which would have
the effect of reducing the scope for moral hazard by implementing: (i)

98

Scott, supra note 76 at 18-31, provides data showing a high degree of mobility of financial
institutions between the state and federal governments in the United States in response to changes in
substantive regulation. He credits the defection of institutions from a chartering jurisdiction with
responsibility for legislative changes that match the innovations introduced in the destination
jurisdiction. As in the Canadian case, Scott observes at 33 that "[b]anidng agencies apparently respond
more vigorously to the loss of existing members than to the prospects of obtaining new members;
behaviour is more defensive than aggressive." J.MacIntosh argues that this type of "passive defensive
strategy" best describes the behaviour of provincial bureaucrats in the Canadian corporate law market.
See . Macintosh, "The Role of Inte jurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law.
A Second Look" (Law and Economics Working Paper Series) (Toronto: Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 1993).
99 For a lively debate over the normative and positive dimensions of enhanced market discipline in
the control of banking risk, see Garten, supra note 45;supra note 18; "Still Banking on the Market: A
Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline" (1988) 5 Yale .on Reg. 241; and J.Macey & E. Garrett,
"Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments" (1988) 5
Yale J.on Reg. 215.
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risk-rated deposit insurance premiums;' 00 (ii) restrictions on the
operation of brokered deposits;' 0 ' (iii) increases in the required level of
capital that must be invested by shareholders and subordinated
creditors in regulated institutions; 0 2 and (iv) various co-insurance
schemes which would force depositors to share some of the risks of
failure with the deposit insurer./3 Some analysts have even gone so far
as to recommend a complete overhaul of the scope of deposit insurance

lW The debate over risk rating focuses on its workability, namely, the inability of regulators to
make accurate and timely assessments of the overall risk of a given institution's portfolio. See Wyman
Report, supra note 19 at 27 (risk rating not possible at present time because there is no consensus on
objective measurement techniques); Scott & Mayer, supra note 29 at 886-895 (authors express concern
that risk rating would require too much administrative discretion which would leave exercise open to
political pressure); Benston et aL (1986), supra note 29 at c. 9 (authors recognize administrative, political,
and informational defects in government administration of risk rated scheme, and suggest that scheme
be supplemented with market information derived from monitoring of net interest margins, rates on
brokered deposits, price of unsecured debt, and market value accounting); L Goodman & S. Shaffer,
"The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms" (1984) 2 Yale J. on
Reg. 145 at 154 (risk rating will increase stress for banks in tight monetary environment, thereby
exacerbating economywide problems).
The empirical data respecting the workability of risk rated premiums is mixed. See, for instance,
Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Market BasedDeposit Insurance Premiums:An Evaluation
(Working Paper No. 150) by K Kuester & J. O'Brien (Washington: Federal Reserve Board, 1991) (stock
market based, risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums are sensitive to accounting information and
have predictive power for future performance, but do not contain all information contained by
accounting data).
101 Macey & Miller, supra note 40 at 1199-203 (brokered deposits enable troubled institutions to
raise insured funds with only modest interest rate premiums. The channelling of funds to marginal
institutions forces other institutions to increase the riskiness of their investment activities in order to
compete. The scope for brokered deposits should be restricted by placing caps on the aggregate amount
of funds an individual can insure across all institutions); Wyman Report, supra note 19 at 30-31
to impose freeze on brokered deposits and restrict percentage of brokered
(recommends right of cDxc
deposits in the asset base).
102 Working Paper Series, Capitalin Banking: Past,Present andFuture (Working Paper No. WP1991/10) by G. Kaufman (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1991) (finds level of capital in
banking system deficient by historical standards). A number of commentators have endorsed the
concept of mandatory levels of subordinated debt in bank capital structure as a way of increasing
market discipline. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, "The Rising Cost of Bank Failures: A Proposed
Solution" (1988) 10:3 J.of Retail Banking 5; S. Keehn, Banking on the Balance: Powersand the Safety
Net (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1989); and L Wall, "A Plan for Reducing Future
Deposit Insurance Losses: Puttable Subordinated Debt" (July/August 1989) Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Econ. Rev. 2. However, empirical data provides only weak support for the ability of
subordinated debt markets to reflect bank riskiness: R.A. Gilbert, "Market Discipline of Bank Risk:
Theory and Evidence" (1990) 72 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Rev. 1.
10 Wyman Report, supra note 19 at 28 (10 per cent co-insurance to begin with first dollar, and
not to exceed $100,000). See, however, Senate Committee (1990), supra note 89 at 13-14 (rejected
Wyman's first dollar co-insurance because of its harsh impact on small depositors who lacked accurate
information and instead recommended full insurance for first $25,000 deposited and 80 per cent
insurance for next $50,000.)
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by restricting it solely to those institutions whose investments are

restricted to government debt."'" In terms of the latter-reform of bail-

out policies-two proposed changes have received the closest attention:
(i) non-discretionary, graduated discipline of institutions (including
seizure) informed by actual equity ratios;'0 5 and (ii) universal adoption
of the modified payoff of depositors upon failure (creditors would

receive only the expected value of their claims in a failed institution, at
irrespective of how the failure is dealt with by the
the time of failure,
6
regulators).
The adoption of these policies could have a profound effect on
the nature of the financial regulatory enterprise in Canada. By
internalizing the cost of institutional risk-taking onto the shareholders,
managers, and depositors of financial institutions, the efficacy of the
system of financial regulation could be enhanced. Further, with an
effective, rational system of regulation, a foundation for a vibrant and
productive federalism would be laid.
In view of the benefits to be realized from restructuring the
system of regulation, the refusal of policy makers to adopt many of the
reforms canvassed above is curious. In both Canada and the United
States, the policy community is well acquainted with the case for these
reforms, but has thus far declined to implement them in any meaningful

14 The narrow bank proposal has been credited to R. titan, What Should Banks Do?
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987). See also .Kareken, "Federal Bank Regulatory Policy.
A Description and Some Observations" (1986) 59 L Bus. 3; and John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, DepositInsurnce andBank Regulation: The Policy Chokes (Working Paper No. 46) by K.
Scott (Stanford: Stanford Law School, 1988).
105 The American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee has proposed the adoption of a
graduated mechanism for government intervention in the operation of a financial institution that is
based on the market value of an institution's invested capital (See "An Outline of a Proposal for
Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Reform" Statement No. 41 of the Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, 13 February 1989, discussed by R. Eisenbeis, "Restructuring Banking: The Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee's Program for Banking Reform" in Kaufman, ed., supra note 21, c. 3
at 29-32). Under the scheme, institutions at one extreme having equity to asset ratios exceeding 10 per
cent would be subject to only modest regulation, while, at the other extreme, institutions having a ratio
below 2 per cent would be subject to mandatory recapitalization and reorganization. Of course, if
regulators are able to close a bank at the point of technical insolvency of a financial institution (i&, the
moment when value of assets dips below value of liabilities and shareholders' equity), then no depositor
should suffer any loss on investment, whether insured or not.
1
6 To lessen the political resistance to liquidation, commentators have called for the resolution of
failure by way of a modified payoff where insured depositors are paid off in full upon failure and
uninsured depositors are paid an amount reflecting the expected proceeds from the liquidation of the
failed bank. See Garrett, supra note 40; and Macey & Miller, supra note 40 at 1184-87. This technique
is a useful supplement in the regulatory arsenal when regulators have delayed too long in the closure of
a bank.
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way.107 Although the perpetuation of perverse policies can be
rationalized in a public choice framework as the by-product of the
triumph of salient interest groups over diffuse public interest, this
explanation is unsatisfactory.
At one level, the winners under these
policies (shareholders and depositors of marginal financial institutions)
would not appear to have the necessary organizational support to
trump other political interests.' °9 Further, when the magnitude of the
costs that can be inflicted on the public purse from opportunistic risktaking is considered (at least one hundred billion dollars in the United
States from the savings and loan debacle), "0 the political saliency of
these claims seems even less significant.
An alternative explanation for the continuation of these policies
lies in the long-standing devotion of financial institution regulators to
secrecy-based regulation."' Given the dependence of capital markets
on timely information, the suitability of grafting changes into a secrecybased system of regulation designed to augment market vigilance is
problematic. Without full, timely disclosure of information regarding the
status of financial institutions, the ability of depositors to make
informed, rational decisions respecting their investments is subverted." 2
In the absence of accurate information, depositors are forced to rely on
crude proxies (for example, assets, years in business, reputation) for
solvency in deciding among competing institutions. In this setting,
107 See, for instance, S.Labaton, "Final Push to Finish Bank Bill" The New York Times (27

November 1991) D1; L. Wayne, "Treasury Criticizes Plan to Limit Bank Insurance" The New York
Tunes (19 June 1991) D2; and S. Labaton, "House Panel Bars Proposal to Limit Deposit Insurance"
The New York Tunes (15 May 1991) D1.
106 Mueller, supra note 11.
109 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

110 Supra note 54.
M//The basis for secrecy regulation is rooted in the fear that timely release of information
containing subjective assessments of the solvency of an institution will spark a debilitating run. In
contrast to the premium that regulators of public securities markets attach to the timely and full
disclosure of all material information bearing on the value of a given investment, financial institution
regulators are much more inclined to withhold material information. The value of information in the
operation of economic markets is discussed by RJ. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman, "The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency" (1984) 70 Virginia L.R. 549. A graphic example of the tension between the
underlying ideologies of the securities and solvency regimes, and the way in which these ideologies inform
regulatory behaviour, can be observed in the events leading up to the failure of a publicly traded
financial institution-Standard Trust. (See D. Fagan, "Other Trusts Could Fail, Official Tells Hearing"
The [Toronto] Globe andMail (14 June 1991) B-3.)

112 AJ.Boro, Jr., "Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behaviour" (1986) 74
Calif. L.R. 431; and Wyman Report, supra note 19 at 29-30.
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lending to financial institutions is reduced to a legalized form of gambling,
with depositors having to place bets both on the soundness of an
institution, as well as on the likelihood that the institution will attract
government assistance in the event that it fails.
In these terms, it is clear that the stark incompatibility between
market discipline and secrecy-based regulation must be resolved before
any amendments designed to increase market oversight can be
undertaken to the current system. This is not a trivial task. The
commitment to secrecy is*deeply embedded in the fabric of financial
regulation. Faith in secrecy emanates from bureaucratic concern over
the prospect of public embarrassment, even financial liability, arising from
a mistaken assessment of institutional soundness, and from concern
that increased disclosure would reduce the creative flexibility enjoyed by
bureaucrats in resolving financial difficulties without engendering public
apprehension and mistrust. In any event, until government officials
reduce their faith in the value of secrecy-based regulation, any effort
to increase market discipline is vulnerable to criticism based on both
efficiency and equity considerations.
Recognizing that the adoption of market-enhancing reforms is,
unfortunately, unlikely to occur in the near future, the task of
reforming financial regulation in order to support a more vigorous
federal dynamic must be achieved through other instruments. One
possibility is to marry the right of provinces to regulate financial
institutions with the responsibility to insure them. The insurance
responsibility could be undertaken in two different ways: (i) by the

13 The danger of these consequences emanates from the highly subjective, assumption laden
nature of the evaluation process. In forming a conclusion as to the soundness of a financial institution,

regulators will have to consider a range of complex issues, including the competence of management, the
quality of highly illiquid assets in an institution's portfolio, and the risk to the institution from changing

market conditions. Since most of these decisions cannot be made solely with accounting data, there is a
discretionary component to any conclusion, which invariably invites competing and often contradictory
claims from the owners and managers of the subject institution. Indeed, even when business valuations
are constructed solely on accounting data, the range of techniques available to the valuator makes the
appraisal process extremely capricious. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the corporate
law appraisal remedy, see J. Macintosh, "The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical

Reappraisal" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LJ. 201. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the
importance or, indeed, legitimacy of these fears. A large part of the data impacting on the solvency of
institutions-for example, loan arrears, aggregate capital, and debt to equity ratios--can be gleaned

from the periodic unaudited reports filed by the industry, and which can therefore be disseminated
without requiring any bureaucratic endorsement. Even where bureaucratic judgment is required, the
doctrine of crown immunity effectively insulates bureaucrats from all but the most egregiously malevolent
exercise of their discretion.
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establishment of stand alone provincial insurance schemes;M4 or (ii) by
retention of the existing scheme of federal deposit insurance, modified
by the creation of risk pools designated by chartering jurisdictions." s In
either case, the costs of failure of financial institutions would be
reflected back onto the primary regulator. The virtue of tethering
regulation with insurance is straightforward: by insisting that provinces
be responsible for whatever costs are generated by the failure of their
institutions, the incentive for provinces to game strategically the federal
government by offering industry participants lax regulation would be
dulled." 6 Indeed, assuming that at least some of the costs of failure of
institutions within the provincial pool are imposed back on remaining
institutions in the form of higher insurance premiums, a crude system
of risk rating would be created.117
VI. CONCLUSION
The delivery of various types of corporate and commercial
policies through competitive governments has proved to be a durable
and, as I have argued, a desirable feature of Canadian regulation. The
heartiness of Canadian federalism in many areas should not, however,
114 The formation of provincial insurance schemes is subject to the criticism that, although
sensitive to federal government concerns regarding excessive provincial risk taking, it does not address
provincial government concerns with the scope for discriminatory treatment among depositors on the
basis of provincial domicile. One way to address this problem, without furnishing explicit commitments to
uninsured depositors, is for provinces to agree to accord the same treatment to depositors located
outside the chartering jurisdiction as to those located within. To address the dangers of strategic
behaviour, whereby institutions raise all of their funds outside of the chartering jurisdiction, provinces
could adopt mutual hostage strategies. (The terminology is from Williamson and is discussed in 0.
Williamson, The Economic Institutionsof Capitalism (New York. Free Press, 1985) c. 7.) For instance,
as a condition of operation, institutions could be required to raise a specified percentage of funds in the
chartering jurisdiction, ensuring that provincial governments will not be able to respond to depositor
demands in an indifferent or capricious way. Another objection, however, to the formation of
provincial deposit insurance schemes is the relatively dismal track record of state run schemes in the
United States. K. Scott in "Deposit Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State and Federal
Governments" (1987) 53 Brooklyn L.R. 27 at 41-43 argues that, on a priori grounds, the federal
government possesses a comparative advantage in the establishment and maintenance of a deposit
insurance scheme owing to its superior risk diversification ability and its greater credibility in dealing with
financial disasters that require the infusion of a considerable amount of money into the financial system.
115 The concept of segregated pools has been endorsed by the Senate Committee (1986), supra
note 15 at 4, but on the basis of institutional character, not domicile of incorporation.
116 Nevertheless, the solution is clearly second best given the disparity in the level of sensitivity of
bureaucrats and private managers to financial incentives.
M7 Inthis respect, the scheme is analogous to provincial workers compensation schemes that have
risk rated pools.
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be taken as an assurance of its continued longevity. As the case study
of loan and trust legislation has shown, the viability of federalism is
delicately related to other government policies and initiatives. To the
extent that policies are introduced that tend to distort outcomes
generated by federal-provincial competition, the system can be
jeopardized. Commentators and policy-makers therefore need to be
more sensitive to the effects of substantive policies on the integrity of
the federalism framework.

